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Abstract
To address users’ concerns about confidentiality and integrity when using the semi-trusted cloud
storage service, an approach utilizing the cryptographic techniques called cryptographic cloud stor-
age was proposed. Even if this model will ease user’s concerns about data leakage, it also introduces
some new problems: because the encryption of data is not meaningful to the cloud servers, many
useful data processing operations performed by cloud servers become infeasible or complicated. In
this dissertation, we study two significant data operations for efficient data retrieval and data sharing
in the cryptographic cloud storage, cryptographic access control and encrypted keyword search.
We first study the encrypted keyword search in a single-user cryptographic cloud storage. In
the single-user cloud environment that mainly serves for personal usage (e.g. Gmail, iCloud), the
data owner can encrypt all data before sending to the cloud servers and later he retrieve the en-
crypted data through an encrypted keyword search protocol. Then, only the data owner has a unique
decryption key and a unique secret search key for data retrieval. We call such a mechanism 1-
write-1-read-1-search. Most existing schemes are designed without considering the difference of
storage/computing power between the client-device and the cloud server. Also, an encrypted key-
word search protocol is always desired to provide the fullest possible search functionality with the
smallest possible loss of data confidentiality. Compared to the equality search techniques which has
been widely applied to the encrypted keyword search schemes, we study the advanced search that
supports a more expressive search manner, i.e., supports various typical users’ searching behaviors
and typing habits, for example, a fuzzy search utilizing wildcard characters. We analyze our schemes
and several existing schemes base on a three-fold (security/efficiency/functionality) trade-off model
to show our contributions.
Secondly, we also study the cryptographic access control and encrypted keyword search in a
more complicated environment, a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage. The multi-user crypto-
graphic cloud storage offers several compelling advantages over the single-user usage described
above, e.g., sharing of data/searchability with different users with an awareness of their access priv-
ileges. Cryptographic access control techniques permit the secure data sharing among various users
with different access privileges. We consider such a use-case that for each encrypted file stored
on the cryptographic cloud storage, it is only allowed to be read, written(update), and searched by
lots of users with appropriate access privileges. We call such a mechanism many-write-many-read-
many-search. In literature, there are two challenging issues that we focus on here. (i) It is difficult
for a cloud server to differentiate access privileges of writers/readers for each encrypted file. Espe-
cially, there maybe numerous encrypted files/users in the multi-user cloud environment. (ii) Most of
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the existing encrypted keyword search schemes ignore the access right of the user while performing
the search algorithm. Such an issue further brings both efficiency and security problems. At first,
search those encrypted files which can not be read/decrypt wastes both processing power and search
time of the cloud server. As we know, the performance of the encrypted keyword search protocol
is always an essential issues. Then, after get the query results containing lots of “trash-data” that
can not be decrypted by the searcher, the searcher (or, client) have to check and filter those “trash”
locally. Moreover, the communication traffic may also increase for transferring those unnecessary
data. On the security side, usually, not all users are allowed to read (decrypt) all the files stored on
the cloud storage. If each user is allowed to search keywords through all the files and obtains the
result that includes those undecryptable ones, privacy information leakage may happens: a search
result leaks the relationship between a keyword and some stored files, even if both the keyword and
the file are encrypted. To solve these problem, we study such an advanced cryptographic access
control aware encrypted keyword for the multi-user cryptographic cloud storage. We give a novel
search concept in the literature where the cloud server is only allowed to search an encrypted key-
word over the searcher’s decryptable data subset by combining the proposed cryptographic access
control scheme, access structure computation, to the encrypted keyword search scheme. Compar-
ing to the existing scheme with the performance simulation result, we show the contribution of our
schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
1.1 Background and Motivation
With fast-paced growth of digital data and exploding storage management costs, more enterprises
and individual users are paying attention to a cost-effective data service model, i.e., cloud storage.
Usually, the cloud storage server is owned and managed by a cloud service provider and is located
off-premise (i.e., in the cloud service provider’s region of control). This means that customers’
data is outside its control and can potentially be granted to untrusted parties. It brings significant
security risk to users, such as data confidentiality and data integrity. The data confidentiality here
means that even the cloud storage provider can not learn any information about customer data. The
data integrity means any unauthorized modification of customer data by the cloud storage provider
can be detected by the customer [30].
To address users’ concerns about confidentiality and integrity when using the cloud storage
service, one common approach is adopting cryptographic techniques. Since most cloud services
are provided by third-party service providers, encryption at the server’s side becomes inappropriate
because the server is not fully trusted. Performing the encryption at the user’s side provides an end-
to-end security solution because the ciphertext is stored on the cloud server, and only authorized
users can read files after performing decryption at the client side. Digital signature techniques
guarantees the data integrity can be verified at any time. Usually, this kind of cloud storage model is
called cryptographic cloud storage [30]. With the prevalence of such a cloud service that provides
security properties, people store more and more sensitive information into the cryptographic cloud
storage servers, such as emails, personal health records, private videos and photos, company finance
data, government documents, etc. Except for the confidentiality and integrity, the cryptographic
cloud storage also provides availability and reliability to users. Availability means customer data
is accessible from any machine and at all times, and the reliability means customer data is reliably
backed up.
Owing to the security functionalities that such a cryptographic cloud storage service provides
to the users, two kinds of usage gain widespread acceptance of various users, a single user cloud
storage service (in Fig. 1.1) and a multiple users cloud storage service (in Fig. 1.2). The first one,
a single-user service case, allows a user to securely backup his personal data to one or more cloud
server(s). Then later, he can access (retrieve) his data from various client-devices, e.g. PC, Tablet,
Smartphone, Smartwatch, etc., at any time and from anywhere through the Internet. Because such
a service only plays like a personal server, the complex access management and secret key sharing
rarely become to important issues. However, while the personal data increases linearly, it will be
difficult to remotely manage all his files. In this case, the (encrypted) keyword search will ease
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the data management and make the data retrieval much more efficient. The second usage, a multi-
user cryptographic cloud storage service, offers several compelling advantages over the single-user
usage, e.g., sharing of data/searchability with different users with an awareness of their access
privileges. A cryptographic cloud storage based electrical medical record (EMR) [4] service allows
a patient to securely create, manage, and control her personal health data in the cloud, which has
made the storage, retrieval, and sharing of the medical information more efficient. Especially, each
patient is promised the full control of her medical records and can securely share her health data with
a wide range of trusted users, including healthcare providers, family members or friends. Except
for the access control techniques based secure data sharing, she can also share the searchability that
allows a user to search the cloud under her/his access privileges.
For these usages of the cryptographic cloud storage service, many cryptographic solutions are
proposed and some of them are indeed taking some effect under many limitations or situations.
For instance, the existing access control schemes are either designed for sharing a few encrypted
data with a small number users while ignoring the key management/distribution burden of the data
owner, or without considering the multiple writer case in a multi-user cloud storage service. Most
encrypted keyword search schemes are designed without being aware of the difference of processing
power between the client-device and the cloud server. Moreover, for the multi-user usage, almost
all existing search schemes did not consider the access privileges difference among the users while
executing an encrypted keyword search. e.g. usually, not all users are allowed to read (decrypt)
all the files stored on the cloud server. If each user is allowed to search keywords through all the
files and obtains the result that includes those undecryptable ones, privacy information leakage may
happen: the result tells whether a keyword is (or, not) related to any files, even if both the keyword
and the file are encrypted. On another side, the performance of the search scheme can be improved
much more if the cloud server only searches each keyword from a subset (e.g. decryptable files)
but not from the whole storage. Thus, lots of security/functionality/efficiency requirements are still
not satisfied and there is still room for improvement in terms of various purpose of utilizing the
cryptographic cloud service. Especially, when the latest cryptographic primitives/frameworks meet
the powerful cloud server and feeble client device architecture, the existing solutions are usually
missing the most appropriate “point of balance” among the famous threefold trade-off: (1) efficiency
versus security, (2) functionality versus security, and (3) efficiency versus functionality. Therefore,
in this thesis we carefully analyze these latest existing techniques which aim at satisfying those
advanced requirements of the cryptographic cloud storage service and choose to study three of them
that are being or will be widely attention-attracted, but not well studied or solved currently.
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Figure 1.1 The usage of single-user CCS
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Figure 1.2 The usage of multi-user CCS
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Cryptographic access control in a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage Cryptographic ac-
cess control is an access control mechanism that relies exclusively on cryptography to ensure con-
fidentiality and integrity of data stored in the semi-trusted cloud server. Here, a semi-trusted (or,
honest-but-curious) server, means that the cloud server can be trusted to adhere to the storage and
data handling protocols, but which tries to learn as much information as possible. In the multi-user
cryptographic cloud storage, cryptographic access control techniques permit the secure data sharing
among various users with different access privileges. Several existing works adopt traditional or the
latest cryptographic primitives for providing such a secure access control to the cloud storage. How-
ever, because it is difficult for a cloud server to differentiate writers and readers of each encrypted
file, most schemes only consider a simple use case that the data owner creates the encrypted file
for sharing with multi-users who are allowed to read but not to update the file, and only the owner
is allowed to update the file. We call it 1-write-many-read. Providing both write and read access
permissions to multiple users can realize a more flexible access mechanism for cryptographic cloud
storage. For example, after the data owner creates an encrypted file on the cloud, users who hold
update access rights are allowed to update that file at a later time without help from the owner. We
call such a mechanism the many-write-many-read. Compared with a personal cloud storage service,
such a multi-user cloud storage service provides not only data confidentiality and integrity but also
availability to users by allowing to store and share a large amount of files for numerous users. To the
best of our knowledge, no existing access control protocols achieve such an advanced characteristic
for the multi-user cloud service.
Encrypted keyword search in a single-user cryptographic cloud storage For the encrypted
keyword search topic, we first discuss the searchable symmetric encryption in a single-user cloud
environment. Under the semi-trusted cloud model, the data owner encrypt all data before sending to
the cloud servers and later he can retrieve the encrypted data through an encrypted keyword search
protocol. Because such a single-user cloud mainly serves for personal usage, only the data owner has
a unique decryption key and a unique secret search key. An encrypted keyword search protocol is
desired to provide the fullest possible search functionality on the server side, without decrypting the
data, and thus, with the smallest possible loss of data confidentiality. The equality search techniques,
which means the keywords which match the query completely hit, has been widely applied to the
encrypted keyword search. However, those advanced search functionalities which support various
typical users’ searching behaviors and typing habits, for example, a fuzzy search utilizing wildcard
characters, are still not well applied to the searchable symmetric encryption in terms of the trade-off
between efficiency and security.
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Encrypted keyword search in a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage As we described
above, a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage service is always expected to offer more com-
pelling advantages/functionalities to users over the single-user cloud. e.g., securely sharing data/
access privileges/ searchability. Searching an encrypted keyword in such a multi-user cloud storage
which allows many-write-many-read becomes much more complicated than searching in a single-
user cloud. After our analysis on existing works, we found that some important challenging issues
are still not fully resolved. Most of the existing encrypted keyword search schemes ignore the ac-
cess right of the user while performing the search algorithm because in general, it is difficult for
the cloud server to distinguish the relationship between one of its valid users and lots of encrypted
files only through one or many received encrypted keyword(s). Such an issue further brings two
problems: (i) Usually, in a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage, not all users are allowed to read
(decrypt) all the files on the cloud server. If each user is allowed to search keywords through all the
files and obtains the result that includes those undecryptable ones, privacy information leakage may
increase: a search result leaks the relation between a keyword and some stored files, even if both the
keyword and the file are encrypted. (ii) Since a search algorithm is processed by the cloud server,
the performance of the search algorithm also becomes to an essential issue. An ideal solution is that
the cloud server only searches each keyword from a subset (e.g. decryptable files) but not from the
whole data set. We also focus on such an encrypted search technique in conjunction with an ad-
vanced cryptographic access control technique called fine-grained access control, in the multi-user
cryptographic cloud storage service.
Since all these three technical issues play important roles in the cryptographic cloud storage,
we aim to carefully study them and propose secure and efficient schemes to solve those challenging
issues.
1.2 Contributions
We know that when searching an encrypted keyword on cryptographic cloud storage, the search
protocols should be designed carefully due to various security requirements and system charac-
teristics. As we described above, considering the requirements of security/functionality/efficiency,
we first propose bloom filter based encrypted keyword schemes which supports a more expressive
fuzzy search in a single-user cloud environment. However, when enhancing the single-user cloud
service to a multi-user cloud service which supports data sharing among lots of users, access con-
trol mechanism should first be concerned for the search scheme. After deeply analyzed the existing
cryptographic access control and encrypted keyword search techniques, with the aim of an efficient
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and secure multi-user cloud service, we first proposed a flexible, fine-grained access control scheme,
and then we proposed an encrypted keyword search scheme that takes account of the proposed ac-
cess control scheme. In particular, we make three major contributions as follows. Here, the first one
mainly contributes to a single-user cloud and the last two pay attention to a multi-user cloud.
1.2.1 Bloom Filter-Based Searchable Symmetric Encryption Supporting Fuzzy Searches
with Multiple-Character Wildcards
We first present bloom filter based encrypted keyword search schemes which support fuzzy searches
in the single-user cryptographic cloud storage. We observe that in an actual encrypted keyword
search application, because it’s very difficult for a user to remember each keyword precisely and it
will be very convenient if the cloud service can support various typical searching behaviors and typ-
ing habits, e.g. fuzzy search. The proposed schemes utilize a space-efficient probabilistic data struc-
ture, Bloom filter, and two kind of wildcards to support a more flexible, expressive query. Several
related works have been proposed in recent years. Compared with their works, our schemes which
consider most efficiency/security/functional requirements/characteristics of such a single-user cloud
service, (1) are much more cost-effective in terms of network traffic, computation and storage cost
of the user client by which lots of computation/storage are transferred to the powerful cloud server’s
side; (2) are analyzed under a strong, widely accepted security model for the searchable encryption,
called adaptive IND-CKA2. The analysis proves the proposed search scheme leaks no more privacy
information to the cloud server than what is allowed by the security definition for semantic security.
(3) are constructed on a hash-based bloom filter. This provides simpler implementation than most
existing works with lots of complicated cryptographic computation.
1.2.2 Fine-Grained Access Control Aware Encrypted Keyword Search
A multi-user cryptographic cloud storage service provides much more advanced functionalities
than a single-user cloud service. Except for allowing the secure backup/retrieval of personal data,
the multi-user cloud service should also provide secure data/searchability sharing among multiple
trusted users. According to our analysis of the security and functionality requirements and sev-
eral latest existing works, we notice that the secure many-write-many-read-many-search should be
achieved in a multi-user cloud service. However, to the best of our knowledge, no existing works
satisfies such an advanced requirements. Because sharing of searchability needs to consider the
sharing of access privileges among trusted users, hereafter we study this motivating problem and
propose schemes in a two-step approach.
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We first combine and exploit the cryptographic access control techniques from two functional
encryption techniques, the attribute-based encryption (ABE) and the attribute-based signature (ABS),
to realize an owner-independent many-write-many-read scheme for the multi-user environment.
The proposed access structure computation provides a flexible, fine-grained access control for the
cryptographic cloud storage which may holds numerous users and files.
Then, we proposed the fine-grained access control aware encrypted keyword search to realize
the many-search. This is a novel search concept in the literature where the cloud server is only
allowed to search an encrypted keyword over the searcher’s decryptable data subset by combining
the proposed cryptographic access control scheme, access structure computation, to the encrypted
keyword search scheme. Two advantages of our approach over most existing works are shown by
our security analysis and performance simulation:
 Decreasing the information leakage from the keyword search process which is executed be-
tween users and the cloud server.
 Being more efficient than existing works since the proposed method does not need to examine
those unreadable files.
Moreover, the proposed many-write-many-read-many-search approach allows the secure update of
both the encrypted data and their indexes from trusted, authorized users. The search scheme is also
analyzed with a variant of the stronger model, adaptive IND-CKA2.
1.3 Outline of The Dissertation
The dissertation proposal is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we make a quick review of exist-
ing cryptographic access control techniques and existing encrypted keyword search techniques for
cryptographic cloud storage. We summarize the challenging issues that is not satisfied with existing
approaches. Then, we show the research point on which our study focus. Chapter 3 introduces our
study on the single-user cryptographic cloud storage and presents a bloom filter based encrypted
keyword search schemes which support fuzzy searches. In chapter 4, we study the cryptographic
access control techniques and present a flexible, fine-grained access control to support many-write-
many-read in a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage. In chapter 5, we continuously study the en-
crypted keyword search in the multi-user cryptographic cloud storage. We presents the fine-grained
access control aware encrypted keyword search to realize the many-write-many-read-many-search.
We conclude in Chapter 6 with a discussion of future works.
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Chapter 2
Cryptographic Access Control and
Encrypted Keyword Search techniques
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In this chapter, we first make a quick review of major techniques that are being adopted by cloud
storage for providing cryptographic access control and encrypted keyword search. We illustrate the
advantage and disadvantage of existing schemes when applied to the semi-trusted cloud model.
Then, we summarize the challenging issues and show our focus in this thesis.
2.1 Cryptographic Access Control techniques
Cryptographic access control is an advanced access control mechanism which relies on cryptogra-
phy technology to ensure confidentiality and integrity of data stored in the untrusted/semi-trusted
storage system, i.e., cloud storage system. In such a system, cloud servers are usually assumed
to be semi-trusted, which mean servers are honest to save user’s file and perform data operations
requested from authorized parties. However, there exist the possibility that some curious servers’
administrators are interest in the content of the stored files. Cryptographic access control tech-
niques provide an end-to-end security where the writers encrypt and sign before storing data/files
to the cloud storage servers and the readers decrypt and verify the integrity of the data on their
client machines. Encryption and decryption is not done on the cloud server side. If the writers are
required to sign their modifications, the signatures also ensure non-repudiation, since the writers
cannot deny their modifications on the data. Because the cloud server only manages encrypted data
without seeing the plain-text, the end-to-end security places minimal trust on the cloud servers and
the data is accessible only to the users with appropriate keys (or, access right). In the literature, the
authorization of encrypted data accessing on the cloud depends on key distribution. There are two
kinds of key distribution mechanism, an in-band method or an out-of-band method [31]. The in-
band method means file decryption keys are stored encrypted along with the files. The out-of-band
method requires key distribution to be handled by some other mechanism, such as by the owner or
by a trusted third party.
Figure 2.1 highlights three major milestones of shared, outsourced storage services providing
cryptographic access control techniques in the last decade. At the earlier stage, cryptographic ac-
cess control was proposed in the shared cryptographic file systems (CFS) [31], e.g., SiRiUs[23],
Plutus[29]. The goal of these shared storage systems is to provide end-to-end security, where tradi-
tional cryptographic operations are performed on the client side to keep data secure from the server
as well as other unauthorized users (including server administrators). These systems embed cryp-
tographic operations (i.e. symmetric or asymmetric encryption/decryption and signing/verification)
into the file system itself. The storage server is minimally trusted and never sees the data in clear-
text as it is not involved in the encryption or decryption process. These systems complement the
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Figure 2.1 Major milestones of outsourced cloud storage service using cryptographic access control
techniques
Traditional CFS
(SiRiUs, Plutus, etc.)
~2003
IBE based CCS
(IBE, HIBE, etc.)
~2004
ABE based CCS
(CP-ABE, KP-ABE, etc.)
2006~
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basic cryptographic services with more sophisticated key management techniques that efficiently
handle key sharing and key revocation. For example, in order to share data with others, SiRiUS
uses the in-band method that stores file-keys encrypted with their public key along with the meta-
data of the data. For scheme of Plutus, they implemented out-of-band method where readers and
writers have to contact the group owners or administrator to acquire appropriate cryptographic keys.
Some of the cryptographic storage systems provide integrity of data and meta-data either by using
a MAC or by using digital signatures. These schemes encrypted different data with different keys,
thus changing the problem of access to data to the problem of key management. However, we found
that this approach no longer holds when applying to cloud storage service, because the complexity
of key management increases with the number of files and/or the number of users, which both could
be enormous in a cloud storage system. As a large number of users are sharing the same infrastruc-
ture in a public cloud storage built upon a complicated network scale, it is crucial to have efficient,
scalable and reliable access control mechanism in place.
Independent of those traditional cryptographic techniques based CFSs, a variant of traditional
public key techniques called Identity-Based Encryption(IBE) [46, 9, 54] has also received consid-
erable attention in the cloud computing. The IBE based schemes serve as the basis of an access
control architecture to the cloud storage in which entities require no interaction with a trusted au-
thority in order to gain access to sensitive data. The idea of IBE was first conceived as an idea by
Shamir [46] as a means to process PKI certificates by allowing the user’s public key to be an arbi-
trary string which can identifies the user in a non-ambiguous way, (i.e., through identities like email
address, social security number etc), which simplifies management of access rights and constraints.
The potential of IBE to provide greater flexibility to entities within a security infrastructure and its
certificate-free approach may well match the dynamic qualities of access control mechanisms in
cloud storage environment. In other words, it seems that the development of IBE may offer more
lightweight and flexible key usage and management approaches within cloud security infrastruc-
tures than traditional PKI scheme does. The advantage was that cost of establishing and managing
the public key authentication framework was reduced significantly. Also the system complexity
of PKI was reduced. To improve the basic IBE schemes, an advanced scheme called hierarchical
identity-based Encryption(HIBE) [21] was proposed. The HIBE schemes support multiple, hier-
archical constraints on access rights. A HIBE scheme also has the advantage that it reduces the
amount of required storage and the complexity of the access right management. The disadvantage
of cloud storage services using the IBE/HIBE scheme was that it does not necessarily have a unique
string identifier for each cloud user.And it is very difficult to efficiently add/delete a user (i.e. a user
ID) to/from the existing group, thus, it always leads to heavy re-encryption in the cloud.
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To solve the problem of the limitation to which the unique identifier brings when utilizing IBE
schemes in the cloud storage, an idea called fuzzy IBE at first, was proposed by Sahai and Wa-
ters [45]. This scheme identifies users by their attributes. This is the first concept of the attribute
based encryption (ABE). Their access control approach allowed for decryption when the number
of overlapped attributes between a ciphertext and a private key exceeds a specified threshold k. In
such an ABE system, a user’s keys and ciphertexts are labeled with sets of descriptive attributes. A
particular key can decrypt a particular ciphertext only if there is a match between the attributes of
the ciphertext and the user’s key. Since access is granted based on attributes of the user, it provide a
attribute based access control model to the cloud storage. Two prominent ABE schemes with more
general tree style access structures, namely, Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [26]
and Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [5], were proposed in 2006 and 2007,
respectively. Both algorithms associated a set of expressively descriptive attributes with an access
structures to enforce access control on the encrypted data, but they work in a reverse manner. In KP-
ABE, each ciphertext was labeled with a set of attributes during encryption, while the users’ private
keys were associated with an access tree specifying which ciphertexts the key can decrypt. On the
contrary, in CP-ABE, users’ private keys were based on a set of their attributes while ciphertexts
are associated with an access tree over the attributes during encryption. As a result, in KP-ABE
scheme, it is the key distributor (i.e. service provider), who decides the access policy, while in CP-
ABE scheme, it is the encryptor (i.e. data owner) who controls the access over the encrypted data.
Based on the expressive access structures, both CP-ABE and KP-ABE can provide a fine-grained
access control to the cloud storage service, where the fine-grained access control systems facilitate
granting differential access rights to a set of users and allow flexibility in specifying the access rights
of individual users. In other words, in the same group the system granted the different access right
to individual user. Users are on the same group, but each user can be granted the different access
right to access data. Even for users in the same group, their access rights are not the same.
2.2 Encrypted Keyword Search techniques
As we described, to address users’ concerns of data confidentiality on the cloud storage, cryptog-
raphy is used in the untrusted cloud storage model. In the cryptographic cloud storage model [30],
because encryption at the server’s side is not appropriate when the server is not fully trusted, data
owners encrypt all data before sending to the cloud servers and later the encrypted data can be re-
trieved and decrypted by users who have a decryption key. Even if this will ease user’s concerns
of data leakage, it also introduces a new problem: because the encryption of data is not meaningful
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to the cloud servers, many useful data processing operations performed by cloud servers become
infeasible. One of the most important operations for efficient data retrieval and sharing in the cloud
is the keyword search. One trivial solution to enable keyword search is to download the whole
database, decrypt it locally and then search for the desired results in the plaintext data. In most
cases, this approach would be impractical. Another method is the server decrypts the data, and
runs the query and sends only the results back to the user. This allows the cloud server to learn
the plaintext data being queried and hence makes encryption meaningless. Instead, it is desirable to
support the fullest possible search functionality on the cloud side, without decrypting the data, and
thus, with the smallest possible loss of data confidentiality. This is called encrypted keyword search
(some papers also call it “searchable encryption”).
An encrypted keyword search scheme allows a cloud server to search in encrypted data on behalf
of a client without learning information about the plaintext keyword. Note, the term “searchable
encryption” might be a bit confusing because one might think/expect that the actual ciphertexts
are searched, but this is not the case. Instead, separate indexes are encrypted in a special way
to make the searching possible, i.e., in most schemes, the client generates a searchable encrypted
index. Usually standard encryption schemes are used in combination with special index generation
and query mechanisms. The encrypted index and the encrypted documents can then be stored on
a semi-trusted (honest-but-curious) cloud server which can be trusted to adhere to the storage and
query protocols, but which tries to learn as much information as possible. In most research papers,
the encrypted indexes are stored on the cloud servers as the encrypted data do.
Figure 2.2 gives an overview and highlights major milestones of the encrypted keyword search
schemes in the last decade. Those existing schemes are constructed based on either a symmetric-
key or an asymmetric-key primitive by which the encrypted index are generated. Following the
figure 2.2, we categorize and summarize the existing milestone techniques in terms of their func-
tionality and security. Firstly, encrypted keyword search schemes are built on the client/server
model, where the cloud server stores encrypted data on behalf of one or more clients (i.e., the writ-
ers). To request content from the cloud server, one or more clients (i.e., readers) are able to generate
trapdoors for the server, which then searches on behalf of the client. This results in mapping the en-
crypted keyword search schemes to the following three kind of cloud architectures: 1-write-1-read-
1-search [48, 22, 25, 11, 50], 1-write-many-read-many-search [17, 43], and many-write-many-read-
many-search [2, 55, 56]. 1-write-1-read-1-search mainly considers the basic search mechanism for
a single user cloud. Specifically, the user just uses the cryptographic cloud server for personal data
backup. He/she creates encrypted index for the later personal keyword searches. So no data sharing
or key material sharing happens. 1-write-many-read-many-search considers a multiple users case
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(i.e., single writer multi-writer for each encrypted data), whereas the single key owner is allowed
to create searchable content, whereas a user-defined group is allowed to generate trapdoors, thus is
allowed to execute the search process. It provides the search ability not only to the owner himself,
but also to other users who share the data accessing right. many-write-many-read-many-search con-
siders an advanced multiple users case, i.e., it allows the existing of multi-writer and multi-reader
for each encrypted data. Compared to the 1-write-many-read, for each encrypted file many-write-
many-read-many-search allows an owner-defined group to update both the plaintext and the index.
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As summarized in Figure 2.2, we also highlight the key functionalities of encrypted keyword
search. In a common scene, a user may search and retrieve the data of their respective interests using
any keywords they might come up with. Compared with the traditional equality search which means
the keywords which match the query completely hit, advanced search functionalities which support
various typical users’ searching behaviors and typing habits also include a range query [10, 13, 20]
which means to test if a data value (e.g., trapdoor) falls within a certain range, i.e., between an upper
and lower boundary; a wildcard search [11, 50, 13], in which the keywords that match any character
other than wildcard characters obtain hits, and here wildcard characters (e.g. “?” or “*”) represent
any characters; a fuzzy search [37, 34, 7], in which the keywords within a certain edit distance from
the query obtain hits; a conjunctive search [25, 10, 20] which means to find documents containing
all of several keywords in a single query (i.e., single run over the encrypted data); a substring
search [15, 25, 13, 20] which means given a data string s and a search string p, find all occurrences
of p as a substring of s.
Encrypted keyword search (or called searchable encryption) schemes need to be proven secure
in some sense. If a encrypted keyword search scheme is found not secure, the encryption is said to
be redundant. To define the security of a searchable encryption formally, a variety security models
have been proposed so far. Since security will never be free, it is said there is always a tradeoff
between security on one hand and efficiency and query expressiveness on the other. In general,
encrypted keyword search schemes that use a security model with a more powerful adversary are
likely to have a higher complexity [12].
In the literature, the first notion of security model in the context of searchable encryption was
introduced by Goh [22], who introduced the concept of semantic security against adaptive cho-
sen keywords attack (IND-CKA). IND-CKA was proposed for secure indexes, a secure data structure
with many uses next to SSE. IND-CKA ensures that the adversaryA cannot deduce the file’s content
from its indexes. Goh remarks that IND-CKA does not require the trapdoors to be secure, since it
is not required by all applications of secure indexes. IND2-CKA, a second slightly stronger security
model, was also proposed by Goh, which protects the document size like Chang and Mitzenmacher’s
definition [14] but still does not provide security for the trapdoors (Chang and Mitzenmacher [14]
also achieve a notion of security similar to IND2-CKA). An IND2-CKA secure scheme generates
those indexes which appear to contain the same number of words for equal size documents (com-
pared to unequal size documents). It means that given two encrypted documents in equal size and
an index, A cannot decide which document is contained/encoded in the index. Consequently, both
IND-CKA and IND2-CKA security definitions are considered weak in the context of searchable en-
cryption because they do not guarantee the security of the trapdoors; that is, they do not guarantee
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that the cloud server cannot recover the keywords being queried from the trapdoor.
To improve the problem vulnerabilities in Goh’s security model, Curtmola et al. [17] introduce
two new adversarial models for searchable encryption, a nonadaptive model called nonadaptive
IND-CKA1 and an adaptive model called adaptive IND-CKA2, which are widely used as the stan-
dard models for searchable encryption schemes. In their work, they revisited the former security
models and pointed out that previous definitions are not adequate and both the security of indexes
and trapdoors are inherently linked. Intuitively, their definitions require that almost nothing should
be leaked from the stored data in cloud server and indexes beyond the outcome and the search
pattern of the queries (or, encrypted keyword search). These revised security definitions include
security for trapdoors and guarantee that the trapdoors do not leak information about the keywords
(except for what can be inferred from the search and access patterns). Definitions of the nonadap-
tive model only guarantee the security of a query scheme if the client creates all queries at once.
This definition might not be feasible for most certain practical scenarios. On the other side, the
adaptive model allows A to choose its queries as a function of previously obtained/used trapdoors
and search outcomes (or, result). Thus, adaptive IND-CKA2 model is considered a stronger security
definition for most searchable symmetric encryption schemes. Later, Kurosawa and Ohtaki [32]
put forth another stronger notion of universally composable (UC) searchable symmetric encryption
which guarantees security even when the query scheme is used in some arbitrary environments. UC
is a general-purpose security model which means that protocols remain secure even if they are arbi-
trarily composed with other instances of the same or other schemes/protocols. However, currently,
UC does not gain widely. It is summarized by Bosch et al. [12] that the adaptive IND-CKA2 defini-
tion/model gained widespread acceptance as a strong notion of security in the context of searchable
encryption.
2.3 Our focus
As we illustrated above (which have been highlighted in Figure 2.1 and 2.2), this dissertation fo-
cuses on cryptographic access control and encrypted keyword search techniques used in the cryp-
tographic cloud storage environment. In this section, we point out the related challenging issues
of these existing works in an outsourced, semi-trusted cloud storage environment. Then, we intro-
duce our approaches and show our contributions: The first approach mainly considers a single-user
(1-write-1-read) cloud environment where the data owner creates encrypted index for the later per-
sonal keyword searches, no data/ key material/ searchability sharing happens. It focus on a more
expressive search technique, an advanced search functionality supporting wildcard search or fuzzy
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search using a Bloom filters [6]. The second approach considers an encrypted keyword scheme
for the purpose of secure data sharing on a multi-user (many-write-many-read) cryptographic cloud
storage. It mainly focus on the cryptographic access control technique and the access control aware
encrypted keyword search.
2.3.1 Bloom filter based Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Being different from the first multi-user search approach, in this thesis we also focus on more
detailed search techniques for a single-user cryptographic cloud storage, an advanced search func-
tionality supporting wildcard search or fuzzy search using a Bloom filters. In this scheme, the data
owner creates encrypted index for the later personal keyword searches, thus, no data sharing or key
material sharing happens. Specifically, we study the searchable symmetric encryption utilizing both
two kind of wildcards, i.e.,“*” and “?”, to conveniently satisfy users’ various searching behaviors
and requirements.
 “*” matches zero or more non-space characters, and it can be used as a multiple-character
wildcard.
 “?” matches exactly one non-space character, and it can be used as a single-character wild-
card.
For example, “he*” will match any word starting with “he”, such as “he”, “her”, “help”, “hello”,
“helicopter”, and so on. On the other hand, “he?” will only match three-letter words starting with
“he”, such as “hem”, “hen”, and so on. Wildcard searches over encrypted data enable the cloud
server to return results (e.g. an encrypted document) that match combinations of characters and
wildcards. Such an advanced SSE scheme using multiple-character wildcard search will be helpful
in the following usecases:
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Wildcard search in a more expressive manner 
 “*2013*.*, 2013*tokyo*.*, module*.c*”
(Search a file name)
 “PC-MA??TCNZ*6, V83-P?83TS*-NW??”
(Search model numbers of some products)
 “Ta* Ni*, Fa*M* ?hao”
(Search an author name from initial characters)
 “Error (code=????): * reboot * .”
“[Urgent]: troubleshooting * decryption *”
“Bug Report: * func a * error return *”
(Search an important information from a log file)
 “192.168.???.13”
“200?:*:*:1a2b:1a2b”
(Search an IP address)
 “1-*-*, *[Tennodai], Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8577 Japan”
(Search an address) 
Compared with existing works [22, 11, 50, 37], our scheme supports a more flexible, expressive
query where the server can search for partially matched encrypted keywords by taking advantage
of both the single-character wildcard “?” and the multiple-character wildcard “*”. Our second
construction is analyzed and proved secure based on a stronger formal model, adaptive IND-CKA2,
and especially, the second construction prevents an information leakage threat, called a correlation
attack. This approach is much more cost-effective in terms of both the network traffic and the
storage cost than [11]. Besides, we also give efficient and secure document update mechanisms of
both variants for practical use in real world applications.
We will discuss the details of this approach in Chapter 3.
2.3.2 Fine-Grained Access Control Aware Encrypted Keyword Search
Although many schemes are discussed and proposed respectively for both access control and search-
able encryption, we find that some significant characteristics are still unsatisfied in the multi-user
cloud storage environment. Several existing works adopt traditional or the latest cryptographic prim-
21
itives for providing secure access control to the cloud storage. However, because it is difficult for a
cloud server to differentiate writers and readers of each encrypted file, most schemes only consider
a simple use case that the data owner creates the encrypted file for sharing with multi-users who are
allowed to read but not to update the file, and only the owner is allowed to update the file. We call it
1-write-many-read. Providing both write and read access permissions to multiple users can realize a
more flexible access mechanism for cryptographic cloud storage. For example, after the data owner
creates an encrypted file on the cloud, users who hold update access rights are allowed to update that
file at a later time without help from the owner. We call such a mechanism the many-write-many-
read. To the best of our knowledge, no existing fine-grained access control protocols achieve such
an advanced characteristic. Few of the existing encrypted keyword search schemes considered the
user’s access right while designing the search algorithm. Most of the existing encrypted keyword
search schemes ignore the access right of the user while performing the search algorithm because
in general, it is difficult for the cloud server to distinguish the relationship between a user and nu-
merous encrypted files only through an encrypted keyword (or called a trapdoor) he/she generated.
Such an issue further brings two problems: (i) usually, not all users are allowed to read (decrypt)
all the files on the cloud server. If each user is allowed to search keywords through all the files and
obtains the result that includes those undecryptable ones, privacy information leakage may happen:
the result tells whether a keyword is (or, not) related to any files, even if both the keyword and the
file are encrypted. (ii) since a search algorithm is processed by the cloud servers, the performance of
cloud server is an essential issue. The performance can be improved much more if the cloud server
only searches each keyword from a subset (e.g. decryptable files) but not from the whole storage.
In this thesis, we present two novel security notions interdependently for the multi-user cryp-
tographic cloud storage based on the attribute-based encryption (ABE) and attribute-based signa-
ture (ABS): a fine-grained and flexible data access control scheme and an access control aware
keyword search scheme. We realized the many-write-many-read-many-search for the multi-user
cryptographic cloud storage.
 In the first result, we provides a fine-grained and flexible many-write-many-read access con-
trol mechanism for cryptographic cloud storage while placing minimal trust on the cloud
server to ensure data confidentiality. The proposed access mechanism does not add any cost
to the data owner for multiple users’ (readers and writers) management, which is often called
owner-free.
 In the second result, we present an encrypted keyword search concept: fine-grained access
control aware encrypted keyword search, which requires the keyword search execution is per-
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formed by the cloud server over the user’s decryptable data scope according to his differential
access right. This proposed encrypted keyword search, utilizing the advantageous effects of
our first access control scheme, can both decrease information leakage from the query process
and be efficient owing to the shrinkage of the cloud server’s search space before executing
the keyword search. The proposed encrypted keyword search scheme is proved secure under
a variant of the adaptive IND-CKA2 model.
We will discuss the details of this approach in Chapter 4 and 5.
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Chapter 3
Searchable Symmetric Encryption
Supporting Queries with
Multiple-Character Wildcards
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Background
Cloud services are spreading rapidly and widely due to advance in computer and telecommunication
technology. Both individual and enterprise users outsource not only data but also processing to cloud
servers for reasons of management cost and convenience. Because most cloud services are provided
by third-party service providers, encryption/decryption at the server’s side becomes inappropriate
because the server is not fully trusted. Therefore the data should be encrypted before outsourced
to the cloud storage servers. However, even if the encryption will ease user’s concerns about data
leakage, it also introduces some new problems: because the encrypted data (or, ciphertext) is not
meaningful to the cloud servers, many useful data operations performed by cloud servers, such as
the search functionality, become infeasible.
Searchable encryption is a technique that allows a client to outsource documents to an honest
but curious server in the encrypted form, such that the stored documents can be retrieved selectively
while revealing as little information as possible to the server. Compared with the traditional equality
search, which means the keywords which match the query completely hit, to support various typical
users’ searching behaviors and typing habits, advanced search functionalities also include a wildcard
search, in which the keywords that match any character other than wildcard characters obtain hits,
and here wildcard characters (e.g. “?” or “*”) represent any characters; a fuzzy search, in which
the keywords within a certain edit distance from the query obtain hits. As a common scene, a
user may search and retrieve the data of their respective interests using any keywords they might
come up with. For example, after a cloud server administrator gets error information “Error (code
= 131415): an automatic reboot by Segmentation fault” from one server, he may want to know
whether any other similar errors happened among other servers from numerous log files, which
include similar keywords like “Error (code = 13????): *reboot*”. In such a situation, search
keywords with wildcards (e.g. “*” and “?”) will also be useful because his search input might not
exactly match those preset keywords due to the lack of exact knowledge about the entire keyword,
typing habits, possible typos, and representation inconsistencies (e.g. “BO BOX” and “B.O. BOX”).
In this section, we study the searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) utilizing both two kind of
wildcards, i.e.,“*” and “?”, to conveniently satisfy users’ various searching behaviors and require-
ments in an outsourced cloud environment.
 “*” matches zero or more non-space characters, and it can be used as a multiple-character
wildcard.
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 “?” matches exactly one non-space character, and it can be used as a single-character wild-
card.
For example, “he*” will match any word starting with he, such as “he”, “her”, “help”, “hello”,
“helicopter”, and so on. On the other hand, “he?” will only match three-letter words starting with
“he”, such as “hem”, “hen”, and so on. Wildcard searches over encrypted data enable the cloud
server to return results (e.g. an encrypted document) that match combinations of characters and
wildcards. Such an advanced SSE scheme using multiple-character wildcard search will be helpful
in the following usecases:
Wildcard search in a more expressive manner 
 “*2013*.*, 2013*tokyo*.*, module*.c*”
(Search a file name)
 “PC-MA??TCNZ*6, V83-P?83TS*-NW??”
(Search model numbers of some products)
 “Ta* Ni*, Fa*M* ?hao”
(Search an author name from initial characters)
 “Error (code=????): * reboot * .”
“[Urgent]: troubleshooting * decryption *”
“Bug Report: * func a * error return *”
(Search an important information from a log file)
 “192.168.???.13”
“200?:*:*:1a2b:1a2b”
(Search an IP address)
 “1-*-*, *[Tennodai], Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8577 Japan”
(Search an address) 
3.1.2 Related Works
In the literature, searchable encryption is a subject started in 2000 from the work of Song et al. [48],
in which they introduced for the first time a symmetric searchable scheme. They have introduced
three basic searchable encryption security properties: the hidden queries, the controlled searching
26
and the query isolation. However, their scheme does not appear to be efficient and practical because
the complexity is linear in the number of keywords multiplying the number of outsourced docu-
ments. Later, practical schemes using Bloom filters, which consider both efficiency and adversary
model for searching in encrypted data were proposed [22, 11, 50, 37]. Goh [22] first introduced an
approach based on Bloom filters. Goh introduced the concept of semantic security against adaptive
chosen keywords attack (IND-CKA) and a second slightly stronger security model IND2-CKA. Later,
Bo¨sch et al. [11] proposed a conjunctive wildcard search scheme over encrypted data and presented
a new security property taking into account an adaptive adversary, called adaptive semantic security
for SSE. Being superior to Goh [22] which mainly supports only the exact keyword search, [11]
supports flexible conjunctive wildcard searches, where a conjunction is the union of any number of
keywords. Suga et al. [50] proposed a flexible fuzzy search scheme which supports a keyword query
containing single-wildcard characters based on the subset query technique [15]. Recently, Mohan et
al. [37] also proposed a fuzzy keyword search scheme for similarity search using a single-wildcard
character, but no security model was considered.
Cash et al. [13] and Faber et al. [20] presented another kind of SSE solution without utilizing
the Bloom filter. Their schemes support Boolean queries on multiple keywords. In particular, [20]
extends the basic Boolean query on exact keywords of [13] to support wildcard queries, phrase
queries, range queries and substring queries. Compared with their complicated computing process,
our Bloom filter-based schemes that use only hash-based operations will allow simpler implemen-
tations.
3.1.3 Contributions of this work
In this section, we study advanced wildcard searches over encrypted data and propose an SSE
scheme supporting queries with multiple-character wildcards. Compared with existing works [22,
11, 50, 37], our scheme supports a more flexible, expressive query where the server can search
for partially matched encrypted keywords by taking advantage of both the single-character wildcard
“?” and the multiple-character wildcard “*”. Our second construction is analyzed and proved secure
based on a formal model, adaptive semantic security for SSE, and especially, the second construction
prevents an information leakage threat, called a correlation attack. This approach is much more cost-
effective in terms of both the network traffic and the storage cost than [11]. Besides, we also give
efficient and secure document update mechanisms of both variants for practical use in real world
applications.
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3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 Definitions and Notations
Bloom Filter [6]
A Bloom filter (BF) is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure to represent a set of elements.
Usually a Bloom filter is realized by a bit array and we assume the length of the array is m. Also
the filter has several independent hash functions and here we assume that there are k hash functions
{hi : {0, 1}∗ → [1,m]}1≤i≤k.
An empty Bloom filter is a bit array a of m bits that are set to all 0’s. To store an element e
in the Bloom filter a, we compute hi(e) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and set a[hi(e)] to 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We
can perform set membership queries on a Bloom filter. For example, to see whether a Bloom filter
a has an element e, we check whether all of a[hi(e)]’s are 1’s for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and if so, the Bloom
filter includes e. Similarly we can also perform subset queries. We note that false positives can
happen, but the probability of false positives can be made sufficiently small by choosing appropriate
parameters.
Pseudo-random Generators
A polynomial time deterministic algorithm G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ(n) is said to be a pseudo-random
generator, if for all PPT D, there exists a negligible function negl(·) such that
| Pr
s∈R{0,1}n
[D(G(s)) = 1] − Pr
r∈R{0,1}ℓ(n)
[D(r) = 1] | < negl(n)
A distribution is pseudo-random if a string chosen according to it cannot be efficiently distin-
guished from a random string. The probabilities above are also over the random bits used by D and
the random choices of the seed and the string r.
Random Oracle Model [3].
All oracle queries, regardless of the identity of the party making them, are answered by a single
function, that is uniformly selected among all possible functions. The set of possible functions is
determined by a length function, ℓout(·) , and by the security parameter of the system. Specifically,
given security parameter k we consider functions mapping {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}ℓout(k) to be a random
oracle. Security of an ideal system is defined as usual. That is, an ideal system is considered secure
if any adversary with the given abilities (including oracle access) has only a negligible probability
of success (or only a negligible advantage). We also stress that a random oracle is a function: if it is
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queried twice on the same input then the output is the same.
3.2.2 SSE Syntax
We consider a userU who stores a set of encrypted documents on an honest-but-curious cloud server
S which can be trusted to adhere to the protocols, but which tries to learn as much information as
possible, e.g., what kind of information U always accesses. U later may want to retrieve some
of the encrypted documents containing a specific keyword (or, a search expression), from S. To
do so, U first stores both encrypted documents and their secure indexes that are generated from
each keyword that he may search for later, in S. The secure indexes allow U to search encrypted
documents containing a specific keyword. Then, to search for a specific keyword from S, U creates
a trapdoor for that keyword and sends this trapdoor to the server which then returns the result
indicating which documents match the query. U then decides which of the documents she wants
to retrieve and sends the document IDs to S. S returns the requested documents. Our searchable
symmetric encryption schemes consist of the following four algorithms:
 Keygen(1s): Given a security parameter s, Keygen outputs the master private key K. This
algorithm is run by the client.
 BuildIndex(K,D): Given the master key K and a document collection D, the algorithm
outputs an index I . This algorithm is run by the client.
 Trapdoor(K,w): Given the key K and a keyword w, Trapdoor outputs the trapdoor Tdw for
w. This algorithm is run by the client.
 SearchIndex(Tdw , I): Given a trapdoor Tdw for word w and the index I , the algorithm out-
puts a bit string which indicates the matched documents. This algorithm is run by the server.
3.2.3 Security Model
Security for searchable encryption is intuitively characterized as the requirement that no information
beyond the outcome of a search is leaked. In this section, we use the security definitions for search-
able symmetric encryption (SSE) from [17]. Being different from their original security definitions,
in this section we extend the definition of a basic “Keyword” to a “Keyword/Token Characteristic
Set”, which includes more than one element for supporting a more expressive search with one or
more wildcard characters. Next, in the following description of security definitions, we still use the
“keyword” to represent the meanings of both a “Keyword” and an element of the “Keyword/Token
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Characteristic Set” for simplicity and easy understanding. There are mainly three auxiliary notions:
the history, which defines the user’s input to the scheme; the server’s view, or everything he sees
during the protocols; and the trace, which defines the information we allow to leak to the server.
An interaction between the client and the server will be determined by a document collection and
a set of keywords that the client wishes to search for (and that we wish to hide from the adversary).
An instantiation of such an interaction is called a history.
Definition 3.1 (History) Let W be a dictionary consisting of all possible keywords. A history Hq,is
an interaction between a client and a server over q queries, consisting of a collection of documents
D and the keywords wi used for q consecutive search queries. The partial history Htq of a given
history Hq = (D,w1, ..., wq), is the sequence Htq = (D,w1, ..., wt), where t ≤ q.
The server’s view consists of all the information the server can gather during a protocol run.
Basically, the view consists of the encrypted files E(dFIDi), and their identifier FIDi, indexes I , and
the trapdoors Tdwi . It will also contain some additional common information, such as the number of
BFs attached to each specific document, (Nbf1, ...,Nbfn), and if any, the ID sets of existing BFs of
each file, (SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn), and the position information of all trapdoors, (Pw1 , ..., Pwq) where
Pwj = fpos1, ..., posvwj g, j ∈ [1, q]. Here, fpos1, ..., posvwj g is named as an abstract position set,
where vwj is a variable which depends on each wj and is decided by the number of positions to be
checked by the server (e.g., to be checked to see whether the values equal “1”). The server’s view
also includes the real values of bit positions of the indexes that are checked by the server (because
in some case those indexes are masked before sent to the server, then the real value of each position
may be masked). This kind of information for each wj , called Rwj , will be learned by the server
after executing a keyword search. Specifically, if a position p is checked for one of the BF s and the
BF[p] did not match while searching the trapdoor of wj , such information will be recorded in a bit
array as BA[p] = 0 otherwise 1 for each BF with a unique identifier, BIDwj , such that BABIDwj =
{BA[1], ..., BA[vwj ]}, and Rwj = fBABIDw1 ,..., BABIDwq g.
Definition 3.2 (View) Let D be a collection of n documents and let Hq = (D,w1, ..., wq) be a
history over q queries. An adversary’s view under secret key K of the SSE scheme is defined as
VK(Hq) = (FID1, ..., FIDn, E(dFID1), ..., E(dFIDn), I , Tdw1 , ..., Tdwq , Nbf1, ..., Nbfn, Pw1 , ..., Pwq ,
Rw1 , ..., Rwq , SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn)
The partial view V tK(Hq) of a history Hq under secret key K is the sequence
V tK(Hq) = (FID1, ..., FIDn, E(dFID1), ..., E(dFIDn), I , Tdw1 , ..., Tdwt , Nbf1, ..., Nbfn, Pw1 , ..., Pwt ,
Rw1 , ..., Rwq , SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn)
Definition 3.3 (Access Pattern) Let D be a collection of n documents and Hq = (D,w1, ..., wq) be
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a history over q queries. The access pattern induced by a q-query history H = (D,w), is the tuple
α(H) = (D(w1), ..., D(wq)).
Finally, the trace consists of all the information that we are willing to leak or the server is
allowed to learn. The information includes the file IDs and their related query words in the history
and information that describes which trapdoors in the view correspond to the same underlying words
in the history. The index and encrypted files are also stored on the server, so the size of files
|dFIDi |, the length of the a bloom filter |BF | and the number of BF s attached with each document,
(Nbf1, ...,Nbfn), will be leaked. In some case, it may also leak the ID sets of existing BFs of each
file, SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn , We add also the sequence (D(w1), ..., D(wn)) which denotes the access
pattern of a client, and the search pattern Πq of a client as any information that can be derived from
knowing whether two arbitrary searches were performed for the same word or not to the trace. More
formally, Πq can be thought of as a symmetric binary matrix where Πq[i, x] = 1 if wi = wx, and 0
otherwise, for 1 ≤ i, x ≤ q. Since the server will search for a keyword by checking the stored BFs
(i.e., bit arrays) with the received trapdoor, the following two kind of information, (1) the abstract
position set of each trapdoor, Pwj = {pos1, ..., posvwj } for trapdoor Tdwj , and, (2) (Rw1 , ..., Rwq )1,
the real values of each meaningful bit position BF[p] that are checked by the server (because in
some case that indexes are masked before sent to the server).
Definition 3.4 (Trace) Let D be a collection of n documents and Hq = (D,w1, ..., wq) be a history
over q queries. The trace of Hq is the sequence
Tr(Hq) = (FID1, ..., FIDn, |dFID1 |,...,|dFIDn |, |BF |, SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn , Nbf1, ..., Nbfn, D(w1),...,
D(wq), Πq, Pw1 , ..., Pwq , Rw1 , ..., Rwq )
We use a simulation-based approach from Curtmola et al.[17] to introduce the security defini-
tion for semantic security. Here we assume the client initially stores a number of documents and
afterwards does an arbitrary number of search queries. Intuitively, it says that given all the informa-
tion the server is allowed to learn (Trace), he learns nothing from the information he receives (View)
about the user’s input (History) that he could not have generated on his own.
Definition 3.5 (Adaptive Semantic Security for SSE).
An SSE scheme is adaptively semantically secure if for all q ∈ N and for all (non-uniform)
probabilistic polynomial-time adversariesA, there exists a (non-uniform) probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm (the simulator) S such that for all traces Trq of length q, and for all polynomially
samplable distributions
Hq = fHq : Tr(Hq) = Trqg
1The access pattern, i.e., a sequence (D(w1), ..., D(wn)), may be deduced from (Rw1 , ..., Rwq )
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(i.e., the set of histories with trace Trq), all functions f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ(m) (where m = |Hq|
and ℓ(m) = poly(m)), all 0 ≤ t ≤ q and all polynomials p and sufficiently large k:
| Pr[A(V tK(Hq)) = f(Htq)] - Pr[S(Tr(Htq)) = f(Htq)] | <
1
p(k)
where Hq
R← Hq, K←Keygen(s), and the probabilities are taken over Hq and the internal coins
of Keygen, A,S and the underlying BuildIndex algorithm.
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3.3 Our Constructions
We extend the approach of Suga et al. [50] supporting single-character wildcards such that we can
also use multiple-character wildcards. We assume that there is an upper bound u of the keyword
length in our schemes. In [50], one Bloom filter (i.e., array) is created from one keyword. For
example, if the keyword is “abc\0”2, a keyword characteristic set {‘1:a’, ‘2:b’, ‘3:c’, ‘4:\0’} is
extracted from the keyword and stored in the Bloom filter. To perform a search with a search
expression “?bc” which means that the second character should be ‘b’ and the third character should
be ‘c’, a search token (which is also a Bloom filter) is created with a token characteristic set {‘2:b’,
‘3:c’}. As a result, the search operation is reduced to a subset query on the Bloom filters, and in this
case, the search token “?bc” can match the keyword “abc” because {‘2:b’, ‘3:c’} ⊆ {‘1:a’, ‘2:b’,
‘3:c’, ‘4:\0’}. In [50], only single-character wildcards (i.e., ‘?’) are supported. We extend how
to create keyword/token characteristic sets to support multiple-character wildcards in the search
expressions.
3.3.1 Keyword/Token Characteristic Sets
We begin by explaining how to create a keyword/token characteristic set from a keyword with a
simple example. First, let’s consider a simple keyword w = “abcc\0” and its keyword characteristic
set SK(w). In our construction, the set SK(w) consists of two sets S(o)K (w), S
(p)
K (w), i.e., SK(w) =
S
(o)
K (w) ∪ S(p)K (w). The set S(o)K (w) is set to {‘1:a’, ‘2:b’, ‘3:c’, ‘4:c’, ‘5:\0’} similarly to [50].
Further the set S(p)K (w) consists of two sets S
(p1)
K (w), S
(p2)
K (w) that are created by considering all
the pairs of two characters3 (including \0) in w.
More specifically, S(p1)K (w) is computed as
S
(p1)
K (w) = {‘1:1:a,b’, ‘2:1:a,c’, ‘3:1:a,c’, ‘4:1:a,\0’, ‘1:1:b,c’, ‘2:1:b,c’, ‘3:1:b,\0’,
‘1:1:c,c’, ‘2:1:c,\0’, ‘1:1:c,\0’}.
For example, the element ‘3:1:a,c’ in S(p1)K (w) comes from the subsequence of ‘a’ and ‘c’ (i.e.,
“abcc”) and the first 3 means the distance between ‘a’ and ‘c’ and the second 1 means that this is
the first appearance of the sequence of ‘a’ and ‘c’ with distance 3.
2\0 is a null character and we include it in the keyword explicitly.
3in other words, all the subsequences of length 2
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Similarly S(p2)K (w) is computed as
S
(p2)
K (w) = {‘-:1:a,b’, ‘-:1:a,c’, ‘-:2:a,c’, ‘-:1:a,\0’, ‘-:1:b,c’, ‘-:2:b,c’, ‘-:1:b,\0’,
‘-:1:c,c’, ‘-:1:c,\0’, ‘-:2:c,\0’}.
The element ‘-:2:a,c’ in S(p2)K (w) comes from the subsequence of ‘a’ and ‘c’ (i.e., “abcc”) and this
time we do not specify the distance between ‘a’ and ‘c’, so we use -, and the second 2 means that
this is the second appearance of the subsequence of ‘a’ and ‘c’ with distance being unspecified.
SK(w) is defined as S(o)K (w) ∪ S(p1)K (w) ∪ S(p2)K (w). Then, the user can query any part she want
form the set SK(w).
Next we explain how to create a token characteristic set from a search expression with another
example, a case that the search expression contains some wildcard characters. Let’s consider an
extended search expression e′ = “*aa*b(5)*x??z*c(13)*\0” and its token characteristic set ST (e′).
First we mention the difference between the search expression in [50] and our extended one. Sim-
ilarly the set ST (e′) consists of two sets S(o)T (e′), S
(p)
T (e′), i.e., ST (e′) = S
(o)
T (e′) ∪ S(p)T (e′). The
set S(o)T (e′) is set similarly to [50]. Further the set S
(p)
T (e′) consists of two sets S
(p1)
T (e′), S
(p2)
T (e′)
that are created by considering all the pairs of two characters (including null) in e′. The token
characteristic set generation process are described here.
Input: an extended search expression, e.g., e′ = “*aa*b(5)*x??z*c(13)*\0”
Output: a token characteristic set including S(o)K (e′), S
(p1)
K (e′), S
(p2)
K (e′)
1. S(o)T (e′) = {‘5:b’, ‘13:c’}. If there is any character with a specific appearance order
in the search expression, extract each character with its appearance order, then add to
S
(o)
T (e′).
2. S(p1)T (e′) = {‘2:1:x,z’, ‘1:1:a,a’, ‘1:1:a,b’, ‘2:1:a,b’, ‘1:1:z,c’}.
If there is any single-wildcard character(s) “?” sandwiched between two characters or
any consecutive characters, extract all the possible character pairs then add to S(p1)T (e′).
Next, if the search expression contains one or several single-wildcard character(s) ‘*’,
extract all subsequence of two-character pairs together with their specific distance while
respecting the appearance order.
3. Sp2T (e′) = {‘-:1:a,a’, ‘-:1:a,b’, ‘-:1:a,x’, ‘-:1:a,z’, ‘-:1:a,c’, ‘-:1:a,\0’,
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‘-:2:a,b’, ‘-:2:a,x’, ‘-:2:a,z’, ‘-:2:a,c’, ‘-:2:a,\0’, ‘-:1:b,x’,
‘-:1:b,z’, ‘-:1:b,c’, ‘-:1:b,\0’, ‘-:1:x,z’, ‘-:1:x,c’, ‘-:1:x,\0’,
‘-:1:z,c’, ‘-:1:z,\0’, ‘-:1:c,\0’ g.
Remove all “?” and “*” from the search expression to form a new string, e.g. aabxzc\0.
Then extract all possible two-character pairs, and set its appearance order if there exists
a duplicated pair.
In this TCS generation algorithm, we first give an idea to express the multiple-character wild-
cards “*” with both the distance of any two characters and their appearance order. Assume the
length of a search expression is n, which means the search expression is composed of n characters,
then we obtain a polynomial time complexity of our TCS generation algorithm, O(n2), where 2
comes from the two-character combinations, and it indicates that our proposed algorithm takes all
possible two-character combinations from the given search expression.
3.3.2 First Construction with Higher Efficiency but Weaker Security
We first introduce the first construction which supports efficiently the updateable search on en-
crypted documents. Since the same keyword (or, element of the token characteristic set) will be
translated to the same BF for all documents, the degree of BF similarity (which also means docu-
ment similarity) is not protected in this scheme although the higher efficiency is realized compared
with our second construction.
 Keygen(1s): Given a security parameter s, generate a secret master key K = {k1, k2, ..., kr},
consisting of r independent secret keys.
 BuildIndex(K, D): The input is the master secret key K and a document collection D con-
sisting of a set of n documents. FIDi denotes the file identifier of a specific document dFIDi ,
where i ∈ [1, n]. For each document, generate a list of all its keywords and their attached
keyword characteristic sets SK(w) = {e1, e2, ..., eℓ} as described in Section 3.3.1. This
construction prepares one Bloom filter per keyword characteristic set. The index thus can be
represented as an m×b binary matrix where m means the number of keywords in a document
and b is the size of a single Bloom filter in bits. To generate the Bloom filters for each SK(w)
of the documents D and then to output the index, the user executes the following processes:
1. For each element ej (j ∈ [1, ℓ]) in SK(w):
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(a) Generate its trapdoor: Tdej = {pos1, pos2, ..., posr}, where posx = RO(kx, ej) for
x ∈ [1, r]. RO means a hash function modeled as a random oracle [3].
(b) Set the Bloom Filter BF: Set the bits at the positions of Tdej in its BF to 1.
2. Create the index IFIDi from all BFs: IFIDi = (BF1, ..., BFm)T.
 Trapdoor(K,w): Given the key K = {k1, k2, ..., kr}, for a search expression w, first gen-
erate its token characteristic set ST (w) as described in Section 3.3.1. For each element ej of
ST (w), calculate its trapdoor Tdej = {pos1, pos2, ..., posr}, where posx = RO(kx, ej) for
x ∈ [1, r], j ∈ [1, ℓ]. Then, output the trapdoor for the search expression: Td = {Tde1 ,Tde2 ...,Tdeℓ}.
 SearchIndex(Td , I): Given a trapdoor Td = {Tde1 ,Tde2 , ...,Tdej} and all the indexes IFIDi
for all i ∈ n, j ∈ [1, ℓ] documents are checked as follows. Check if any BF from IFIDi
contains 1’s in all locations denoted by any Td. If some BF matches, the server returns the
related FIDi to the client.
3.3.3 Second Construction with Higher Security
In the 1st construction, each element of the keyword characteristic set is represented by the same
r positions in all Bloom filters. Anyone (e.g. the server) who can access the index will know
the similarity of documents from their indexes because two similar Bloom filters mean the similar
keyword/element is included in both documents. Such an information leakage is called correlation
attack [11]. To prevent such an correlation attack and to gain a higher level resilience against
information leakage, we also extend our first construction to a “masked” index scheme with higher
security. Compared with the existing work [11], our construction is much more cost-effective both
on the network traffic and on the storage cost of the client.
 Keygen(1s): Given a security parameter s, generate a secret master key K = ⟨KH ,KG⟩,
with KH = {kx}x∈[1,r] being r independent keys and KG ∈ {0, 1}∗.
 BuildIndex(K, D): The input are the secret key KH , KG and a document collection D
consisting of a set of n documents. FIDi denotes the file identifier of a specific document
dFIDi , where i ∈ [1, n]. For each document, generate a list of all its keywords and their
attached keyword characteristic sets, SK(w). This construction also prepares one Bloom filter
per keyword, which means each BF is prepared for a unique set, SK(w), in one documents.
Then the index can be represented as an m × b binary matrix where m is the number of
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keywords and b is the size of a single Bloom filter in bits. To generate the Bloom filter for
each SK(w) and finally output the index of a document, executes the following algorithms:
1. Generate a unique identifier, BID, as the ID of the BF (for each set SK(w)). To distin-
guish each BID and ensure its uniqueness on each keyword/document, it uses both the
file ID, FIDi, and the keyword w, to generates the BID:
BIDw = RO(KG,FIDi ∥ w)
For each document, the number of its attached BIDs is the number of its keywords.
Then, for each element ej where j ∈ [1, ℓ] in the set SK(w):
(a) Generate the trapdoor, Tdej : Given the key KH = {k1, k2, ..., kr}, for each el-
ement ej , it calculates the trapdoor Tdej = {pos1, pos2, ..., posr}, where posx =
RO(kx, ej) for x ∈ [1, r].
(b) Set the Bloom filter, BF : Set the bits at the positions of Tdej in BF to 1.
2. Create a mask for the BF . For each position (or, bit), BF[p] where p ∈ [1, b], compute
its mask-bit, MB[p]:
MB[p] =RO(BID,RO(KG, p))
Here, the output of RO is the first bit of the output of RO().
3. Mask each bit in BF[p] with MB[p] using the bitwise XOR operation:
BF[p] = BF[p] ⊕ MB[p]
then output each (masked) BFi for i ∈ [1,m], an m× b binary matrix, together with its
BID. Finally, the index of a document, I = (BF1, ..., BFm)T with the BIDs of each BFi,
will be sent to and saved on the server.
 Trapdoor(K,w): Given the secret keys KH and KG, for a search expression w, first generate
its token characteristic set ST (w) as described in Section 3.3.1. For each element ej of ST (w),
where j ∈ [1, ℓ],
1. It first calculates the first part of the trapdoor Td1st = {pos1, pos2, ..., posr}, where
posx = RO(kx, ej) for x ∈ [1, r].
2. Using another secret key KG, it calculates Td2nd = {RO(KG, pos1), RO(KG, pos2),
..., RO(KG, posr)} as the second part of the trapdoor.
Then, output the trapdoor Td = {Tde1 ,Tde2 , ...,Tdeℓ}, where Tdej = ⟨Td1st,Td2nd⟩ to query
the server.
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 SearchIndex(Td , I): Given the trapdoor Td = {Tde1 ,Tde2 , ...,Tdeℓ}, where Tdej = ⟨Td1st,Td2nd⟩,
the server checks all its stored indexes, I , for the matching document(s). The server executes
the following processes:
1. According to each position of {pos1, pos2, ..., posv} from the received Td1st (v is de-
cided by the number of elements in Td), it extracts corresponding columns as a Sub-
Index, S-I, from all stored indexes.
2. Based on the received Td2nd = {RO(KG, pos1), RO(KG, pos2), ..., RO(KG, posv)}
and all stored BIDs, it generates the mask-bits using posx and BIDi, where i ∈ [1,m]
and x ∈ [1, v].
MB′i[x] = RO(BIDi, RO(KG, posx))
3. Unmask S-I with MB′i[x] where x ∈ [1, v]. For each bit of S-I, it calculates:
S-I’[i][x] = S-I[i][x]⊕MB’i[x]
and then output the bitwise AND result S-I’ that is an m× v unmasked subindex.
4. Check if any row S-I’[i] in the subindex S-I’ contains 1’s in all v locations. If so, output
the related file ID(s) dFIDi as the matching document(s).
3.3.4 A Discussion on the document updates
Both of our constructions support efficient and secure updates on the document collection, D, in the
sense that the valid user is allowed to add and delete any document to/from D.
In our first construction, since the same keyword (or, element of the token characteristic set)
is translated to an identical BF for all documents, the server can integrate all identical BFs (which
are generated from different documents) to a unique BF for managing documents more efficiently.
Thus, the server appends all the files IDs (FIDi) which contain the same keyword/element, to the
unique BF. We give a toy example which shows a binary search tree based BF in Figure 3.1. In this
example, the tree has five indexes, 110, 101, 011, 010, 001 (i.e., the length of a Bloom filter is three
here). If we want to add a document, d5, which has two BFs, 101 and 010, then we just link the file
ID to the corresponding nodes of the tree. If we want to delete a document, d5, then we just need to
delete its file ID which is linked to the corresponding nodes of the tree.
We can add the following two algorithms to our first construction:
 Add(K,D). This algorithm is equal to BuildIndex(). The new index I (including BFs) and
its FIDi is sent to the server. Then, based on BFs included in the I , the server links the FIDi
to the corresponding nodes of the binary search tree.
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Figure 3.1 Binary search tree based document updates
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 Delete(FIDi). Given a file ID FIDi, delete it from the binary search tree.
During such an update operation, the algorithm reveals only the processed file ID and the number
of its related BFs.
In our second construction, because the similarity between documents (BFs) is considered
as an information leakage, each BF is masked before it is stored on the server. Then, the same
keyword/element will be transformed to different BFs for each documents. Sharing the identi-
cal BF among different documents (as in our first construction) will not work, so the server must
maintain a unique index (or, a set of BFs), for each document. Thus, the operations (update/ad-
d/delete) for a document will be quite simple where the server just needs to add or delete the new
FIDi and its unique index I without leaking extra information. Owing to the proposed BID where
BIDw = RO(KG,FIDi ∥ w), the server can identify duplicated BFs (and avoid storing the same
BF twice) of a document.
 Add(K,D). This algorithm is equal to BuildIndex(). The new index I (including BFs ap-
pended with their corresponding BIDs) and its FID is sent to the server. If the FID already
exists, the server checks the BID to avoid a duplicated BF .
 Delete(FIDi). Given a file ID FIDi, the server deletes it together with its I (including all its
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BFs) from its storage.
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3.4 Security Proof
In this section, we give the security proof of our second construction. At this point, we do not take
the external update algorithms (in Section 3.3.4) into account.
Theorem 3.1 In the random oracle model, our second construction with secure extension described
in Section 3.3.3 is secure in the sense of Adaptive Semantic Security for SSE scheme in Definition
3.5.
Proof. Let q ∈ N, and let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. We will describe
a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S as in Definition 3.5 such that for all polynomially-
bounded functions f and all distributions Hq, S can simulate the partial view of an adversary
A(V tK(Hq)) given only the trace of a partial history Tr(Htq) for all 0 ≤ t ≤ q with probability
negligibly close to 1. For all 0 ≤ t ≤ q, we show that S(Tr(Htq)) can generate a simulated view
V ′tK(Hq) is indistinguishable from V tK(Hq). Let
Tr(Hq) = (FID1, ..., FIDn, |dFID1 |,...,|dFIDn |, |BF |, SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn , Nbf1, ..., Nbfn, D(w1),...,
D(wq), Πq, Pw1 , ..., Pwq , Rw1 , ..., Rwq )
be the trace of an execution after q search queries and let Hq be a history consisting of q search
queries such that Tr(Hq) = Trq. Then the simulator S works as follows: S chooses n random
values Rnd1, ..., Rndn such that |Rndi| = |dFIDi | for all i ∈ [1, n]. S also includes the FID1, ...,
FIDn, Nbf1, ..., Nbfn, Pw1 , ..., Pwq , Rw1 , ..., Rwq , SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn known from the trace, in the
partial view.
Then the simulator S generates a simulated index I ′ = (B1, ...,Bn)T with random Bi ∈ {0, 1}b,
for i ∈ [1, n]. I ′ will be included in all partial views V ′tK(Hq) used to simulate A. Next, S
simulates the trapdoor for query wt, 1 ≤ t ≤ q in sequence. If Πq[j, t] = 1 for some 1 ≤ j < t
set Td’wt = Td’wj , and otherwise, S generates the simulated trapdoor for the query t, Td’wt =
{Td’e1 ,Td’e2 , ...,Td’eℓ}, where Td’ec = ⟨Td’1st,Td’2nd⟩. For each Td’ec , S first randomly picks
each posv ∈ [1, b] from the abstract position set of the trace, and generates Td′1st, such that Td′1st
= fpos1, ..., posvwtg. Then, S picks a random value Rnd’ec as an “element” for c ∈ [1, ℓ] and
calculates
Td′2nd = f RO(KG, RO(k1,Rnd’ec)), RO(KG, RO(k2,Rnd’ec)), ..., RO(KG, RO(kr,Rnd’ec))g
Note, during the simulation, S controls random oracle RO(). Whenever the adversary A queries
x to the RO(), to evaluate RO(x), S first checks if it has already recorded a pair (x, r), in which case
RO(x) evaluates to the value r. Otherwise, S picks a random value r, records (x, r) and evaluates
RO(x) to r. Finally, S constructs a simulated view
V ′tK(Hq) = (FID1, ..., FIDn, E(dRnd1), ..., E(dRndn), I ′, Td’w1 , ..., Td’wt , Nbf1, ..., Nbfn, Pw1 , ...,
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Pwt , Rw1 , ..., Rwt , SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn)
and eventually outputs A(V ′tK). We now prove that V ′tK(Hq) is indistinguishable from
V tK(Hq) = (FID1, ..., FIDn, E(dFID1), ..., E(dFIDn), I , Tdw1 , ..., Tdwt , Nbf1, ..., Nbfn, Pw1 , ..., Pwt ,
Rw1 , ..., Rwt , SetFID1 , ..., SetFIDn)
We now claim that V ′tK(Hq) is indistinguishable from V tK(Hq) and thus that the output of A
on V tK(Hq) is indistinguishable from the output of S on input Tr(Hq). Therefore we first state
that: for all FIDi and all Nbfi, SetFIDi where i ∈ [1, n], Pw1 , ..., Pwt , Rw1 , ..., Rwt , in V ′tK(Hq)
and V tK(Hq) are identical, thus indistinguishable. E(·) is semantically secure encryption algorithm
(IND-CPA) [24], thus E(dFIDi) is indistinguishable from E(Rndi) of the same length. It is also
clear that I ′ is indistinguishable form I , otherwise one could distinguish between a random string
I ′ = (B1, ...,Bn)T of size b and [BF [p]⊕MB[p]]p∈[1,b], which means the bitwise XOR of a BF-bit
(the former) and the mask-bit (the latter) that are both generated from the RO(). Then, what is
left is to show that the simulated trapdoor Td’wj is indistinguishable from Tdwj , where 1 ≤ j < t.
For each element ec of the trapdoor, Td’ec = ⟨Td’1st,Td’2nd⟩, because Td’1st is picked from the
trace as an abstract position set, it is identical, and thus is indistinguishable. For the Td’2nd which
is calculated from the RO(), it is easy to see that the it is also indistinguishable, otherwise one
could distinguish RO(KG, RO(kt, ec)) from RO(KG, RO(kt,Rndec)). Consequently, each Td’ec
is indistinguishable thus a trapdoor Td’wj is also indistinguishable from Tdwj . Since V ′
t
K(Hq) is
indistinguishable from V tK(Hq) for all 0 ≤ t ≤ q, the output of A will also be indistinguishable.
This completes the proof.
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3.5 Related work and Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, previous schemes, except that of [11], did not consider the Bloom
filter based wildcard search in the adaptive semantic security model, which is a stronger security
model for searchable symmetric encryption. Hereafter, we mainly discuss the Bloom filter based
schemes.
First, the work of [22] only realized the Bloom filter based equality search (or, full-text search)
and was proved secure under a weaker IND-CKA model. [50] extends the search expression to
support general fuzzy search using a single-character wildcard, i.e., “?”, and their security model
is based on the IND-CKA model. As a trivial idea, multiple-character wildcards “*” can also be
expressed by the single-character wildcards “?”. In that case, the trivial solution finally needs an
exponential time complexity, O(nx), for trapdoor generation process, where n is the maximum
length of the search keyword and x means the number of “*” to be expressed by “?”. In the example
we described in Section 3.1.1, to express “*reboot*” which contains two “*”, x = 2, the algorithm
needs the time complexity O(n2). In case of x = 3, such as “*reb*t*”, the complexity will increase
to O(n3). We can see this exponential solution is worse than our polynomial construction from
the viewpoint of time complexity. However, on the other side, we also note that a trade-off exists
between the time complexity and search accuracy. Specifically, the more search patterns (elements
or trapdoors) are prepared the higher matching accuracy a search algorithm will achieve. Thus the
decrease of the time complexity may increase the false positive rate of the proposed schemes. This
trade-off problem is not deeply discussed in this work, and we suggest it needs to be considered for
further research from the viewpoint of search accuracy.
In [11], being similar to ours scheme, their first scheme use the Bloom filter “as-is” for effi-
ciency. Because each keyword is represented by the same positions among all Bloom filters, this
scheme leaks the information of document similarity to cloud servers. Their second scheme, called a
2-round masked scheme, is proposed to prevent such an information leakage problem: the user first
masks all of the indexes locally before sending them to the cloud server. Then, the masked indexes
are saved on the cloud server to ensure no such similarity information is leaked. After receiving a
query from the user, i.e., a trapdoor, the server has to search and generate the masked answer which
contains both real and fake file IDs. Finally, the searcher unmasks the answer and obtains the real
file IDs, and then access the document by the real file IDs. Obviously, this 2-round masked scheme
increases both the communication traffic and storage cost for transferring and managing those fake
answers.
To solve this kind of similarity information leakage problem, we proposed the secure 1-round
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scheme using a novel BID. This construction does not increase the communication cost and storage
(management) cost for the user and the BIDs do not need to be maintained on the user side. More-
over, our constructions also considered the application of secure and efficient document updates
(i.e., addition and deletion of documents).
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3.6 Conclusion of this work
We proposed SSE schemes supporting encrypted keyword queries in a more expressive and flexible
manner. Both of our two variants use Bloom filter for efficiency. The first scheme is more efficient
in terms of computation and storage cost on the cloud server side, while the second scheme is more
secure in the sense that we prevent the correlation attack by masking the indexes before sending to
cloud servers. Our second scheme is proven secure against adaptive adversaries.
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Chapter 4
Realizing Fine-grained and Flexible
Access Control to Outsourced Data with
Attribute-based Cryptosystems
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4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background and Motivation
With fast-paced growth of digital data and exploding storage management costs, more enterprises
and individual users are paying attention to a cost-effective data service model, i.e., cloud storage.
Usually, the cloud storage server is owned and managed by a cloud service provider and is located
off-premise (i.e., in the cloud service provider’s region of control). This means that customers’ data
is outside its control and can potentially be granted to untrusted parties. It brings significant security
risk to users, such as data confidentiality by unauthorized data access. The data confidentiality here
means that even the cloud storage provider can not learn any information about customer data.
Traditionally, there are two kinds of frameworks which are proposed for ensuring the confiden-
tiality of outsourced data. The first one is called server mediated model, it assumes the data owners
and the servers storing the data are in the same trusted domain, which means that storage service
providers can both read all data from data owners and allow accesses from any parties. Storage
service based on this model such as Amazon’s S3[1] and Microsoft’s Azure storage service[39]
provide customers with scalable and dynamic storage. This kind of storage service model brings
several benefits including availability (being able to access data from anywhere) and reliability
(not having to worry about backups). While benefits of the server mediated model are clear, its
assumption no longer holds in the cloud computing environment since the trust problem of cloud
storage service providers: in many cases, customers do not want their personally identifiable infor-
mation or secret data (e.g. medical and enterprise financial records) to be read or modified by any
unauthorized party even cloud storage service providers. The second one, which is called untrusted
storage model, assumes storage service providers are untrusted. The goal of this kind of systems
is to provide end-to-end security, where cryptographic operations are performed on the client side
to keep data secure from the server as well as other unauthorized users. In the second model, data
owners encrypt all data before sending to the storage servers. They can authorize data accessing by
distributing decryption keys to users by an in-band method or an out-of-band method[31]. The in-
band method means file decryption keys are stored encrypted along with the files. The out-of-band
method requires key distribution to be handled by some other mechanism, such as by the owner or
by a trusted third party.
Since the trusted storage server model no longer holds in the cloud computing environment as
we discussed, we pay our main attention to the second model: untrusted storage server model. Next,
we introduce existing works in the areas of “shared cryptographic file systems” and “access control
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of outsourced data”.
4.1.2 Related Works
Goh et al. [23] and Singh et al. s[47] describe two cryptographic outsourced data sharing schemes
providing end-to-end security which adopt the in-band key distribution method. The traditional
cryptographic primitives (symmetric/asymmetric) are used in the two schemes for encrypt/decrypt
and sign/verify. Previous works of [53], [42], [28] and [36] are also providing end-to-end security
for outsourced data sharing that adopt the out-of-band key distribution method. In the work of
Wang et al. [53], they use the traditional cryptographic primitives (symmetric /asymmetric) for
encryption/decryption and sign/verify, and all cryptographic keys are handled by the data owners.
The work of Morohashi et al. [42] employs ID-based encryption for secure outsourced data sharing.
Works of Ion et al. [28] and Li et al. [36] apply the attribute-based encryption (ABE) to manage
the sharing of encrypted data. Detailed comparison of our scheme with these previous works will
be discussed in the last section of this section.
4.1.3 Challenging Issues
Even if the trust problem of cloud storage service providers is solved at some distance under the
untrusted storage provider’s model, some significant characteristics are still unsatisfied in the cloud
computing environment which is composed of thin clients and conveniently centralized provision of
both computing and storage resources. Below, we list several challenging issues of existing works.
 Most existing works (e.g.[23], [47], [53]) which are based on traditional cryptographic prim-
itives (symmetric /asymmetric) only allow a party to encrypt data to share with a particular
user, but are unable to efficiently handle more expressive types of encrypted access control,
which we say, the fine-grained access control1[5].
 Several existing works (e.g.[23], [53]) use the key management protocol that needs file owners
to manage all cryptographic keys for all files, and file owners are responsible for distributing
keys to users individually. In the cloud storage environment with lots of files to share with
lots of users, this method will take huge key management and key distribution overhead for
file owners.
 Several latest approaches (e.g. [28], [36], [42]) similar to ours also use IBE or ABE for pro-
viding fine-grained access control to users. However, most of them only consider the problem
of sharing encrypted data created from the original owner, we call it 1-write-many-read. Few
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ABE systems consider the flexible many-write-many-read case, which means after the owner
creates one encrypted file on the storage server, other users with appropriate attributes can
also update the encrypted file at a later time without any help from files’ original owners.
 Almost all existing ABE based cloud storage systems did not consider the insurance of out-
sourced data integrity.
4.1.4 The contributions of this work
Main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
 Our scheme provides a fine-grained access control and flexible many-write-many-read frame-
work for cryptographic cloud storage while placing minimal trust on the cloud storage server
to ensure data confidentiality.
 To achieve strong data confidentiality even toward cloud storage service providers, our ABS
based reader/writer differential access control method neither leaks files’ plaintext nor any
secret keys to the cloud server.
 Under the cloud stoarge service architecture with thin clients and conveniently centralized
provision of both computing and storage resources, by utilizing the access structure from
ABS, our protocol does not add any costs of key distribution to clients and does not exist any
additional restraint for users (data owner) to be always online for authorization.
 Comparing to the traditional “user level” access control model, our scheme provide a “at-
tribute level” access control with a trusted authority (TA) which caters for the large scale
cloud storage service.
 Finally, our scheme provides the file integrity verification to both users and cloud storage
servers.
1Fine-grained access control systems facilitate granting differential access rights to a set of users and allow flexibility
in specifying the access rights of individual users.
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4.2 System Models and Security Assumption
We describe the system models and their security assumptions in this section.
Semi-trusted storage servers. In our system, we define a semi-trusted model for cloud storage
service providers, which means there exist the possibility that some curious servers’ administrators
are interest in the content of users’ files. However, they (cloud providers) are honest to perform the
service it provides: (1) integrity and availability, which mean saving users’ data honestly without
illegally deleting or changing any bit and sending requested data to legal users; (2) reader-writer
differentiation, which means separating read and write permission by executing the ABS protocol.
Trusted attribute authority (TA). Being similar to the assumption in [5] and [38], TA is a
trusted third party in our system. It is responsible for managing all attributes and their related keys
used in ABE and ABS honestly. Note the detailed mechanism of attribute management by the TA
will not be discussed in our section, so please refer to [33] for a detailed discussion about TA’s trust
and management policies.
Users. There are two kind of users in our system: reader (read-only) and writer (read-write).
We differentiate the two by their specific attributes. There exists the possibility that multiple users
with different attributes, which means they hold different private keys, may work independently or
cooperatively to perform a decryption that is outside the scope of their access privileges. We call it
the collusion attack.
Communication. All communication between each party is assumed secure under TLS/SSL in
the network/transport layer.
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4.3 Technical Preliminaries
Our scheme builds on the work by Bethencourt et al., Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) [5], and Maji et al., Attribute-based signature (ABS) [38]. Only a conceptual introduction
is given here, please refer to their works for a more detailed algorithm description.
4.3.1 Bilinear map
Bilinear map is the basis to understand both CP-ABE and ABS.
Let G0 and G1 be two bilinear groups of prime order p. Let e : G0 × G0 → G1 denote the
bilinear map. Let g be a generator of G0. Bilinear map e has following properties:
 Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ G0 and a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab
 Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) , 1.
 Computable: e(u, v) can be efficiently computed for any u, v ∈ G0.
4.3.2 Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE)
CP-ABE is one of the latest public key cryptography primitives for secure data sharing. A user’s
private key will be associated with an arbitrary number of attributes expressed as strings. When a
party encrypts a message, they first specify an associated access structure over attributes. Users will
be able to decrypt a ciphertext if their attributes satisfy the ciphertext’s access structure.
The construction of our scheme is partially built on the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based En-
cryption (CP-ABE) [5] of Bethencourt et al. We describe the detailed algorithms in this section. At
a mathematical level, access structures in CP-ABE are described by a monotone access structure
(or access tree) Tdecrypt [5]. If a set of attributes U satisfies the access tree Tdecrypt, we denote it as
Tdecrypt(U) = 1. The function attr(x) denotes the attribute associated with the leaf node x in the
tree. The concept of access tree and satisfying an access tree are used in the whole section:
Definition 4.1 Access Tree. Let T be a tree representing an access structure. Each non-leaf node
of the tree represents a threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold value. If numx is
the number of children of a node x and kx is its threshold value, then 0 < kx ≤ numx. When kx =
1, the threshold gate is an OR gate and when kx = numx, it is an AND gate. Each leaf node of the
tree simply represents an attribute.
Definition 4.2 Satisfying an Access Tree. Let T be an access tree with root r. Denote by Tx the
subtree of T rooted at the node x. Hence T is the same as Tr. If a set of attributes γ satisfies the
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access tree Tx, we denote it as Tx(γ) = 1. We compute Tx(γ) recursively: if x is a non-leaf node,
evaluate Tx′(γ) for all children x′ of node x. Tx(γ) returns 1 if and only if at least kx children
return 1. If x is a leaf node, then Tx(γ) returns 1 if and only if att(x) ∈ γ.
CP-ABE algorithms are described as following steps:
Setup is probabilistic and run by TA. A master key MK and a public key PK are generated in
this step.
Let G0 and G1 be two bilinear groups of prime order p. Let e : G0 × G0 → G1 denote the
bilinear map. Let g be a generator of G0. Next it will choose two random exponents α,β ∈ Zp, and
computes:
h := gβ, f := g1/β , Y := e(g, g)α
H is the hash function: H : {0, 1}∗ → G0. So the public key is: PK := (g, h, f, Y,H), and the
master key is MK := (β, gα).
Encryption(PK,m, Tdecrypt) is probabilistic and run by a user who wants to encrypt a plaintext
message m for a user with a set of attributes in the access structure Tdecrypt, this algorithm generates
a ciphertext CT .
It first converts Tdecrypt to its corresponding monotone span program M ∈ (Zl×tp ). Then it
randomly chooses s, u2, ..., ut ∈ Zp and sets −→u := (s, u2, ..., ut), (s1, ..., sl) := M · t−→u . The
function ρ(i) denotes the attribute associated with ith row of n. Then it computes:
c0 := m · Y s, c′ := hs,
{
ci := gsi , c′i := H(ρ(i))si
}
i=1,...,l
The ciphertext is CT := (M, c0, c′, {ci, c′i}i=1,...,l).
Key-Generation(MK,U ) is probabilistic and run by TA: on input the master key MK and a
set of attributes U belonging to a user, a secret key SK for these attributes is generated.
With inputs MK and U , it first chooses r, rj ∈ Zp (j ∈ U ), then computes:
D := g
α+r
β , {Dj := grH(j)rj}j∈U ,
{
D′j := grj
}
j∈U
Then the key is set as SK := (D,
{
Dj , D
′
j
}
j∈U ). Collusion attack will not work since the blinding
value r is used to randomize each user’s private key.
Decryption(CT, SK) is deterministic and run by a user with a set of attributes U . On input CT
and SK, this algorithm outputs the underlying plaintext m, if CT is a valid encryption of m and U
satisfies the access structure Tdecrypt specified in the computation of CT . Otherwise an error will
be returned. There exist λi’s that satisfy
∑l
i=1 λi ·
−→
M i = (1, 0, ..., 0) where
−→
M i denotes the i-th row
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vector of M . Then, it computes:
m′ = c0 · e(c′, D)−1 ·
∏
ρ(i)∈U
(
e(Dρ(i), ci)
e(D′ρ(i), c′i)
)λi
= c0 · e(c′, D)−1 ·
∏
ρ(i)∈U
(
e(grH(ρ(i))ri , gsi)
e(gri , H(ρ(i))si)
)λi
= c0 · e(c′, D)−1 ·
∏
ρ(i)∈U
e(g, g)r·si·λi
= c0 · e(hs, g
α+r
β )−1 · e(g, g)r·
∑
ρ(i)∈S si·λi
= m · e(g, g)αs · e(g, g)−αs−rs · e(g, g)rs
= m
4.3.3 Attribute-Based Signature(ABS)
ABS is a versatile primitive that allows a party to sign a message with fine-grained control based
on its attributes. More specifically, the signer, who possesses a set of attributes, can sign a message
with a predicate that is satisfied by his attributes.
Our scheme is also based on the Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) [38] of Maji et al. We describe
the detailed algorithms of ABS in this section. There are two entities exist in ABS: a central trusted
authority (TA) and users. The authority is in charge of the users’ cryptographic keys. Denote
the universe of attributes as U , As the access structure in the CP-ABE, there is a monotone boolean
claim-predicate (access structure) Tsign over U whose inputs are associated with attributes of U . We
say that an attribute set U satisfies a predicate Tsign if Tsign(U) =1. The algorithms are described
as follows.
Setup The authority obtains a key pair (PK,MK) and outputs public parameters PK and
keeps a private master key MK.
Choose suitable cyclic groups G and H of prime order p, equipped with a bilinear pairing e :
G × H → GT . Choose a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p. We treat A = Z∗p as the universe of
attributes, where p is the size of the cyclic group. tmax means the claim-predicate whose monotone
span program has width at most tmax. Choose random generators:
g, C ← G; h0, ..., htmax ← H
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Choose random a0, a, b← Z∗p and set:
A0 = ha00 ; Aj = haj and Bj = hbj(∀j ∈ tmax)
The master key is MK = (a0, a, b). The public key PK is a description of the groups G, H and
their pairing function, as well as:
(H, g, h0, ..., htmax , A0, ..., Atmax , B0, ..., Btmax , C)
Key-Generation(MK,U ) To assign a set of attributes U to a user, the authority computes a
signing key SKU and gives it to the user.
On input MK as above and attribute set U ⊆ A , Choose random generator Kbase ∈ G. Then
Set: K0 = K1/a0base ; Ku = K
1/(a+bu)
base , (∀u ∈ U ).
SKU = (Kbase,K0, {Ku|u ∈ U})
Sign(PK,SKU ,m, Tsign) To sign a message m with a claim-predicate Tsign, and a set of
attributes U such that Tsign(U) = 1, the user computes a signature σ by (PK,SKU ,m, Tsign).
First, convert Tsign to its corresponding monotone span program M ∈ (Zp)l×t, with row la-
beling u : [l] → A. Also compute the vector v⃗ that corresponds to the satisfying assignment U .
Compute µ = H(m∥Tsign), then pick random r0, r1, ..., rl and compute:
Y = Kr0base; Si = (K
vi
u(i))
r0 · (Cgµ)ri , (∀i ∈ l);
W = Kr00 ; Pj =
l∏
i=1
(AjBu(i)j )Mij ·ri , (∀j ∈ t).
Here, the signer may not have Ku(i) for every attribute u(i) mentioned in the claim-predicate. But
when this is the case vi = 0, and so the value is not needed. The signature is σ = (Y,W, S1, ..., Sl, P1, ..., Pl)
Verify(PK,m, Tsign, σ) To verify a signature σ on a message m with a claim-predicate Tsign,
a user runs Verify(PK ,m,Tsign , σ), which outputs a boolean value, accept or reject.
First, convert Tsign to its corresponding monotone span program M ∈ (Zp)l×t, and compute
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µ = H(m∥Tsign), if Y = 1, then reject. Otherwise check the following constraints:
e(W,A0)
?= e(Y, h0);
l∏
i=1
e(Si, (AjBu(i)j )Mij )
?=
e(Y, h1)e(Cg
µ, P1), (j = 1);
e(Cgµ, Pj), (j > 1);
for 1 ≤ j ≤ t. Returns accept if all the above checks succeed, and reject otherwise.
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4.4 Fine-grained and Flexible Data Access Control
4.4.1 Overview of Our Scheme
In order to achieve the fine-grained and flexible data access control to outsourced data, we combine
and exploit two latest cryptographic techniques, CP-ABE and ABS. In our system (Fig. 1), the
file owner creates a file, encrypts it by CP-ABE and then signs the encrypted file by ABS with his
access policies (access structure). Then the file owner send the encrypted file with its signature
(ABS) to the cloud storage server. A creative idea proposed in our shceme is that the file’s owner
publish the Tsign to the file server after he/she decides the ABS’s verification attribute policy of
the file, then the file server can use Tsign to verify the ABS with the verification keys from TA.
For other users who want to upload a modified file to the cloud storage server, they must possess
attributes described in Tsign that are specified by the file’s original owner, and thereby the ABS can
be verified with the original Tsign by the cloud storage server. As our setting in Section 2, the semi-
trusted storage server will be responsible for managing the file updating from users by verifying the
ABS. Moreover, since the ABS in our scheme is based on the hash value of the encrypted file, ABS
can also help cloud storage servers and valid users to verify the file’s integrity. TA plays the root of
trust and manages all keys corresponding to all attributes: decrypt-key, sign-key and verify-key. As
an example in Fig. 4.1, users who only possess attributes “Director”∨“Manager” can decrypt (read)
the file, called readers; users who possess attributes “Director”∧“Manager”∨“trustee” can not only
read the file but can also update the file to the file server. The definition of Tdecrypt and Tsign is
shown in Fig. 4.2.
Note that our scheme is different from another attribute based solution, signcryption [49], which
also includes encryption and signature together with an access structure. In that scheme, since the
decryption and verification must be executed simultaneously, it restricts their scheme to differentiate
readers and writers by the semi-trusted cloud storage server. Next, we will show details of our
scheme with flexible access control.
4.4.2 Writer-Reader Differentiation
One of the most important characteristics in data sharing is the ability of separating readers and writ-
ers to the same file. In our scheme, the writer-reader differentiation is accomplished by exploiting
the ABS verification protocol. The semi-trusted cloud storage server manages all files’ updates by
verifying the ABS which is signed by valid writers with appropriate attributes. Note that we do not
need to differentiate writer and reader at the individual user level, but at the attribute level. From the
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viewpoint of key management complexities, the attribute level management model is much better
optimized than the user level management model since the latter’s management complexities may
increase linearly with the number of users, but the former, will not. Moreover, comparing most
existing works which only provide “1-write-many-read” service, our reader/writer differentiation
method achieves a more flexible “many-write-many-read” data sharing access control.
In our scheme, owners and writers are both defined as writers. However, there are some dif-
ferences between the two. Owners can create file and define both the decryption policy and verify
policy at an initial stage. After the file was uploaded to the cloud storage server, the update policy
(ABS’s access structure) will be sent to the cloud storage server for authenticating writers and read-
ers. Here we will give a more formal description of each step: create a file, read a file, update a
file.
4.4.3 Data Access Procedures
4.4.3.1 Create a file
Encrypt Phase. The owner first encrypt a file for sharing with other users. This encryption should
be based on the public keys in CP-ABE that corresponds to decryption attributes. The decryption
policy in the CT is described by the access structure Tdecrypt. The ciphertext CT of a file M would
be generated as follows (PKE and SKE describe related public and private keys in CP-ABE; PKS
and SKS describe related public and private keys in ABS):
CT = Enc(PKE ,M, Tdecrypt) (4.1)
Sign Phase. After the encryption, the owner signs the CT both for reader/writer differentiation
which is performed by cloud storage servers and for providing integrity verification to all parties
who want to access the file. The owner first hashes the CT which is generated in the Encrypt Phase
and then signs it by the ABS. There may exist an attack that a malicious reader may impersonate
the valid writer by uploading an old version encrypted file with its old signature (ABS) which was
signed by a former writer to the cloud storage server, it is called an replay attack. In this situation, the
cloud storage server can not distinguish whether the update is valid because the ABS can be verified
following the verification attribute policy which were set by the original owner. Our approach to
prevent the replay attack is to add a period of validity t as a exploition to the ABS. The server
only accept valid updates in t (the length of term t can be decided by the file size and the network
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bandwidth). We exploit the ABS’s sign process as follows:
SG = Sign(PKS ,SKS , h(CT )∥t,Tsign) (4.2)
Upload Phase. After the Encrypt Phase and Sign Phase, the owner will upload the encrypted file
CT with its signature SG and the period of validity t, (CT , SG, t, Tsign), to the file server. At this
step, the owner must send the update attributes policy (Tsign) to the storage server for authenticating
ABS, and then, to differentiate writers and readers.
After accepting the file uploading request from the file owner, cloud storage servers first check
the validity of twith current time, and obtain all verification keys PKS that corresponds to attributes
depicted in the Tsign from the TA, then verify the SG by the boolean value result of R0 (true or
false):
R0 = Verify(PKS , h(CT )∥t,Tsign ,SG) (4.3)
If the verification is successfully finished (R0 is true), cloud storage server will accept the upload
request and save the t, Tsign and verification keys PK with the encrypted file CT .
4.4.3.2 Read a File
The reader takes the following steps to read a file.
Verify Phase. (1) Obtain the file {CT, SG, t, Tsign} from the file server. (2) Request corre-
sponding public keys PKS from TA by his attributes U to verify SG by the result of R1:
R1 = Verify(PKS , h(CT )∥t,Tsign ,SG) (4.4)
Decrypt Phase. If R1=true and Tdecrypt(U) = 1, plaintext of M will be obtained with keys SKU
which correspond with his attributes U , following the decryption process:
M = Decrypt(CT ,SKU ) (4.5)
4.4.3.3 Update a File
If a user holds writer’s attributes, then he can update a file M to M1 as follows. (1) Encrypt M1
as the encrypt phase : CT1 = Enc(PKE ,M1, Tdecrypt1). (2) Sign CT1 as the sign phase: SG1 =
Sign(PKS , SKS , h(CT1)∥t1, Tsign). (3) Upload (CT1, SG1, t1, Tsign) to the cloud storage server
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as the upload phase. (4) Cloud storage server will first check the validity of t1, then verify the
ABS SG1 by the Tsign and PKS which were created by the file’s original owner, as depicted in the
Upload Phase. By the result of the ABS verification, cloud storage server will accept or reject the
update request.
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4.5 Performance Analysis and Discussion of Existing Works
In this section, we first numerically analyze the performance of our scheme in terms of the com-
putation and the storage overhead that put on user’s side by each cryptographic operation since the
main system limitation in our scheme is on the user client side (we assume the cloud providers
always have sufficient computation power and storage). Secondly, we give a careful comparison of
our scheme with several latest existing works.
4.5.1 Performance Analysis
As introduced in our proposal, the following processes are fully processed on the user’s client side:
(1)Create a File, (2)Read a File, (3)Update a File. For analyzing the computation complexities of
each process which includes several cryptographic operations such as CP-APE and ABS, we use
following notations:
Notation Description
E0 Cost of exponentiation operations in G0
E1 Cost of exponentiation operations in G1
L Cost of bilinear pairing
p Prime order of G0 and G1
U The attribute set in the access structure (tree)
l, t The matrix {l × t} of the monotone span program which is converted
from its corresponding access structure
The computation overhead generated from processes (1) and (3), Create/Update a File, are
actually the same, which include two operations, one operation of CP-ABE Encryption and one
operation of ABS-Sign. In terms of the computation details of CP-ABE and ABS that are described
in Section 3, user’s computation cost of the CP-ABE Encryption and the ABS-Sign utilized in our
proposed scheme both grow linearly with the size of access structure’s matrix {l × t}. This costs
are mainly generated from the exponentiation operations in G0 and G1.
The computation overhead generated from the process (2), Read a File, also includes two op-
erations, CP-ABE Decryption and ABS-Verification. The user’s computation costs of the CP-ABE
Decryption grow linearly with the number of his attributes which are satisfied with the access struc-
ture. More precisely, the cost are mainly generated from the exponentiation operations in G1 and
paring computations. The user’s computation cost of the ABS-Verification are also generated from
the paring computations and exponentiation operations in G0. This cost are also growing linearly
with the size of access structure’s matrix {l × t}. The computation complexities of cryptographic
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operations which are included in the three main steps executed on the user’s side are summarized in
the following Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Computation complexity (on the user client side)
Operations Protocols Computation Complexity
Create a File [28] O(E1 × log p) +O(|U | × E0 × log p)
[36] O(E1 × log p) +O(|U | × E0 × log p)
Our Scheme O(E1 × log p) +O(l × E0 × log p)
Read a File [28] O(|U | × L) +O(|U | × E0 × log p)
[36] O(|U | × L) +O(|U | × E1 × log p)
Our O(l × L) +O(|U | × E1 × log p)+
scheme O(l × E0 × log p)
Update a File [28] Not supported
[36] O(E1 × log p) +O(|U | × E0 × log p) + Csign + Cenc
Our Scheme O(E1 × log p) +O(l × E0 × log p)
4.5.2 Discussion of Existing Works
Several existing works close to ours have been listed in the first section of this section, such as [23],
[47], [53], [42], [28], [36]. Next, we give a careful comparison of our scheme with their works, See
Table 4.2.
Goh et al. [23] and Singh et al. [47] are two cryptographic outsourced data sharing schemes
which adopt the in-band key distribution method. Traditional cryptographic primitives (symmet-
ric/asymmetric) are used to provide end-to-end data security. Both of the two schemes store the
access control information in the meta data file. Goh et al. [23] stores the ACL (Access Control
List) in the meta data for file’s access control. Each file in the system is encrypted using AES (Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard), the AES key is encrypted by the public key of each valid user, then
the data ownerstores all the encrypted key files on the storage server for sharing. Singh et al. [47]
hierarchically encrypts data, meta data and directory table using AES. Only the root of AES keys is
encrypted by the public key of each user or user group. All encrypted keys are stored on the storage
servers. By introducing user groups and directory tables, it outperforms Goh et al. [23] a lot by the
evaluation result. The main problem of Goh et al. [23] is that owners have to encrypt each file’s
encryption key for all users individually, which will take heavy computing costs. The main issue of
Singh et al. [47] is that if there exists a collusion between a malicious storage server and any single
malicious user, the malicious server can expose decryption keys of all the encrypted data in the same
directory of the malicious user. Furthermore, both of two schemes can not resist the replay attack
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and did not consider fine-grained access control for sharing outsourced encrypted files. In contrast,
our scheme does not need data owners deal with any keys for data sharing. The collusion resistance
of our scheme is achieved by the CP-ABE. Moreover, our scheme are designed to resist the replay
attack and provides a flexible and fine-grained access control for sharing outsourced encrypted files
on the storage server.
Table 4.2: A comparison of seurity function between our scheme and existing works1 .
Fine-grained E2E Data Key Mana. E2E Data Many-Write Implement
Access Control Conf. Method Int. -Many-Read -ation
[23] NO YES in-band YES YES YES
(small-scale)
[47] NO YES in-band YES YES YES
[53] NO YES out-of-band NO NO Not yet
(small-scale) (1-W-M-R)
[42] YES YES out-of-band NO NO Not yet
(IBE) (1-W-M-R)
[28] YES YES out-of-band NO NO Not yet
(CP-ABE) (1-W-M-R)
[36] YES YES out-of-band NO YES Not yet
(KP-ABE) (conditional)
Our YES YES out-of-band YES YES Not yet
scheme (CP-ABE)
In Wang et al. [53], an owner’s data is encrypted block-by-block using the symmetric key
cryptography. To share encrypted files with other users, an out-of-band key distribution model are
used in their protocol: a binary-key tree is constructed over the block keys to reduce the number
of keys given to each user, all binary-key trees for all files must be managed by files’ owners. If
owners want to share their file with other users, they must distribute the binary-key tree and referred
key generation information to users individually. Since the key management complexity of this
scheme is based on the files number, the overhead for key information management are linearly
increasing as the file numbers growing up. The fine-grained access control is also not considered in
their scheme. Users’ read and write rights are not separable. In comparison, our scheme delegate
all key management tasks to the TA, file owners do not need to manage and distribute keys to users
for data sharing. Our scheme allows fine-grained access control to the encrypted files on the cloud
storage servers. Our writer-reader differentiation method also achieves more flexible many-write-
many-read data sharing.
1Conf. means confidentiality, Mana. means management, Int. means integrity, small-scale means the scheme is only
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A recent work Morohashi et al. [42] proposes a secure information sharing system based on
the ID based encryption. This work considers both the data confidentiality and the requirement of
fine-grained access control in the cloud storage environment. However, their work only considers
1-write-many-read case. Comparing to their work, our approach can provide a flexible many-write-
many-read by combining and exploiting the CP-ABE and ABS. We also decrease the computation
overhead at the client side by delegating the ABS verification to the storage server without any harm
to the data confidentiality.
Works of Ion et al. [28] and Li et al. [36] are two latest protocols that adopt the ABE (CP-
ABE or KP-ABE) for data encryption to achieve the fine-grained access control. Since their works
and our work all try to realize fine-grained cryptographic cloud storage by the help of attribute
based cryptosystems, we compare the computation complexity of these three works, and the results
are summarized in Table 4.1. The work of Ion et al. [28] describes a secure publish/subscribe
framework that publishers (owners) can share encrypted information to subscribers (readers) with
the help of untrusted brokers (storage servers), an 1-write-many-read scheme. Each file is dually-
encrypted first using CP-ABE and then KP-ABE by the publisher. Finally, the dually-encrypted file
will be send to the broker to be forwarded to the subscriber. For hiding the attributes for decrypting
the file, the publisher also encrypts the access policy (attributes) by combining KP-ABE with multi-
user searchable data encryption (SDE) scheme Dong et al. [19]. Brokers can verify if the encrypted
attributes specified by the publisher are the same as those specified by the subscriber in the filter.
Publishers will take on all the encryption cost of CP-ABE, KP-ABE and SDE. Brokers and filters
will execute the KP-ABE and SDE decryption for forwarding the data to the subscriber. Finally,
subscriber will only take on the CP-ABE decryption cost. Comparing to their scheme, our approach
did not consider hiding access policy to the storage servers at present. This is a future direction
of our research. However, our approach provides a flexible many-write-many-read data sharing
method and we also consider the insurance of data integrity that were not achieved in their work.
The work of Li et al. [36] also describes a fine-grained data access control protocol for sharing
personal health records in the cloud storage. Multi-authority KP-ABE Chase et al. [16] is used
for providing end-to-end data security and the fine-grained data access control. The importance of
many-write-many-read scenario, which called multi-owner setting in their work, is also considered
in the scheme. However, their approach can only enable multiple writers to update the encrypted
file in an inefficient way or, with some limitation. For obtaining the write-access right for each file
suitable for the small scale outsourced data sharing service; large-scale means the scheme fits for large-scale data sharing
service, such as the cloud storage model. conditional means [36] can provide the function only under the restraint that
the file owner need to be always online. 1-W-M-R means 1-write-many-read.
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updating, the user (requester) must contact the file’s original owner (which must be online to reply)
for an individually authorization. The owner must first generate a signature and specify the valid
period of each signature, and encrypt the time-related signature and all the time information by a
public-key encryption algorithm, then send to the requester. Details of signature and public-key
encryption algorithms are not specified, we use Csign and Cenc to denote their computation cost for
the comparison in Table 1. Comparing to their scheme, our ABS based approach provides a flexible
many-write-many-read method for data sharing where owners neither need to be always online nor
need to distribute any credentials to other users individually.
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4.6 Conclusion of this work
In this section, we propose a secure data sharing scheme with fine-grained and flexible access con-
trol which provides many-write-many-read. Two famous attacks in the traditional outsourced data
sharing system, collusion attack and replay attack, are conquered in our cloud storage model. More-
over, except for end-to-end data confidentiality, our scheme can also provide the end-to-end data
integrity. By carefully comparing our scheme with the latest existing works, we also show our
scheme’s advantages and shortcomings.
Extensions to our approach include the following aspects. First, we plan to give the extended
detailed protocol of our multi-TA setting cloud storage model. Second, we want to exploit the
existing keyword-based search on encrypted data protocols to our proposed scheme to realize the
many-write-many-read-many-search. Finally, we will try to implement the full protocol with exist-
ing attribute based cryptographic libraries to verify the usability of our proposed scheme.
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Chapter 5
Fine-Grained Access Control Aware
Multi-User Data Sharing with Secure
Keyword Search
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5.1 Introduction
To address users’ concerns about confidentiality and privacy when using the cloud storage ser-
vice, one common approach is adopting cryptographic techniques. Kamara et al. [30] proposed
an architecture that combines several latest cryptographic primitives with the cloud storage, called
cryptographic cloud storage. Even if this model will ease user’s concerns about data leakage, it
also introduces some new problems: because the encryption of data is not meaningful to the cloud
servers, many useful data processing operations performed by cloud servers become infeasible.
In this section, we consider a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage model to conveniently
satisfy users’ requirements of data confidentiality and privacy. A general use case of the electrical
medical record (EMR) [4] based on this model is described as follows: a patient, Alice, wants
to subscribe her EMR to the medical data center. The service allows Alice to share her health
information and medical record with doctors from different hospitals and staffs from pharmacies or
insurance companies. In order to protect her privacy, Alice wants to encrypt all her information,
ensuring that even the employees of the data center or other unrelated doctors and staff members
cannot know what is inside. Only authorized doctors are allowed to search and read her prior
encrypted EMR and some of them are also authorized to update some items. These authorized
doctors (perhaps belonging to different hospitals/departments) need to update related records in
real time so that the latest EMR can be shared with all relevant persons. The read/update privilege
management mechanism of the EMR must be independent of the data owner, Alice, once she creates
the EMR access permission rule, because it is impossible to require a patient to be always available
online to manage each data access of her EMR.
5.1.1 Challenging issues
Even if many security protocols for cloud storage have been proposed, we find that some signif-
icant characteristics are still unsatisfied in the multi-user cloud storage environment. Below, we
summarize several challenging issues.
 Several existing works adopt traditional or the latest cryptographic primitives for providing
secure access control to the cloud storage. However, because it is difficult for a cloud server to
differentiate writers and readers of each encrypted file, most schemes only consider a simple
use case that the data owner creates the encrypted file for sharing with multi-users who are
allowed to read but not to update the file, and only the owner is allowed to update the file.
Providing both write and read access permissions to multiple users can realize a more flexible
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access mechanism for cryptographic cloud storage. For example, after the data owner creates
an encrypted file on the cloud, users who hold update access rights are allowed to update
that file at a later time without help from the owner. We call such a mechanism the owner-
independent many-write-many-read (OI-MWMR). To the best of our knowledge, no existing
fine-grained access control protocols achieve the OI-MWMR.
 Most of the existing encrypted keyword search schemes ignore the access right of the user
while performing the search algorithm because in general, it is difficult for the cloud server
to distinguish the relationship between a user and numerous encrypted files only through an
encrypted keyword (or called a trapdoor) he/she generated. Such an issue further brings two
problems:
– Usually, not all users are allowed to read (decrypt) all the files on the cloud server. If
each user is allowed to search keywords through all the files and obtains the result that
includes those undecryptable ones, privacy information leakage may happen: the result
tells whether a keyword is (or, not) related to any files, even if both the keyword and the
file are encrypted.
– Since a search algorithm is processed by the cloud server, the performance of cloud
server is an essential issue. The performance can be improved much more if the cloud
server only searches each keyword from a subset (e.g. decryptable files) but not from
the whole storage.
 If we want to apply some traditional encrypted keyword search schemes (e.g. [48, 25]) to the
multi-user cryptographic cloud storage setting, a naive approach is sharing the secret (search)
key. However, sharing keys is generally not a good idea because it increases the risk of key
exposure. Since a shared secret key must be changed if any user is no longer qualified to
access the data, changing keys also results in re-generating all secure indexes. For the cloud
storage with numerous users and files, this approach is not practical.
5.1.2 Contributions of this work
In this section, we study the access control and keyword search scheme of cryptographic cloud
storage. We summarized main contributions of our work.
 We propose an access structure based reader/writer differentiation mechanism. Based on this
idea, the OI-MWMR is successfully achieved and implemented to both of the file body and its
secure indexes.
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 We present an encrypted keyword search approach that we call fine-grained access control
aware encrypted keyword search: the cloud server is only allowed to search an encrypted
keyword over the user’s decryptable data subset using the proposed access structure com-
putation. As an additional contribution, a binary tree based file management approach is
proposed to reduce the computation overhead and optimize the search efficiency. Two ad-
vantages of our approach over most existing works are shown by our security analysis and
performance simulation:
– Decreasing the information leakage from the keyword search process which is executed
between users and the cloud server.
– Being more efficient than existing works since the proposed method does not need to
examine those unreadable files.
 Since each user uses a distinct secret key for his keyword search, the key update and the
user revocation can be easily achieved without complicated processes of decryption and re-
encryption of indexes.
 Several newly extended security requirements are defined for the multi-user model. The se-
curity of our scheme is successfully analyzed and proved based on them.
 Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is widely applied to the cloud for secure data sharing. How-
ever, few practical keyword search scheme is proposed for them because of the complex com-
position of its ciphertext. Our work gives a simple and practical solution for ABE based cloud
storage.
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5.2 System models
We first introduce the entities involved in our scheme, then we identify two important functional
concepts.
5.2.1 Entities
 Cloud Server: The main responsibility of the cloud server is to store and to process encrypted
data according to authorized users’ requests. The cloud server is modeled as honest-but-
curious in our scheme. Cloud servers are assumed to be semi-trusted, which mean servers are
honest to save user’s file and to perform data operations requested from authorized parties.
 Trusted Authority (TA): TA is a fully trusted third party. Firstly, it is responsible for manag-
ing all attributes and their related cryptographic keys. Secondly, it manages user’s enrollment
and revocation for the proposed scheme. The setup process of keys for users and the cloud
storage server is operated by TA.
 Data Owner: A data owner first creates (encrypts) data for sharing and secure indexes for
keyword search, defines the access privileges policies, and then set them up to the cloud
server.
 Users: There are multiple users with different access privileges which map to numerous files
on the cloud server. Except for the data owner, we define two kinds of users for each file,
readers and writers. Readers who have the decryption right and can read. Writers who have
both decryption and encryption rights, can read/update files (including update secure indexes).
Both readers and writers are able to require the cloud to perform the keyword search to retrieve
encrypted files.
5.2.2 Functionality goals
 Fine-grained access control with OI-MWMR:
It facilitates specifying both read and write access rights to each file for a set of users in terms
of their attribute set. The OI-MWMR (owner-independent many-write-many-read) means that
for each file on the cloud, there may exist multiple writers and readers respectively. Writers
are allowed to update a file in a secure manner without any help (e.g. a real-time authorization)
from the data owner.
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 Fine-grained access control aware keyword search: Let n be the number of encrypted files
on the cloud, and a user, u, wants the server to search the files that contain a keyword w.
m (m ≤ n) is the file number on the cloud that can be decrypted by u. This functionality
requires that the cloud executes the keyword search after narrowing the search scope from n
to m by being aware of access privileges of u.
73
5.3 Security requirements and assumption
5.3.1 Security requirements and definitions
We integrate and exploit several security properties from [2, 17, 55, 59, 58] to summarize security
requirements for the proposed scheme under the multi-user cloud model.
 Impersonation Resistance. Traditionally, impersonation resistance requires that an adver-
sary cannot authenticate itself as a legitimate user to any honest entity. In our model, both
readers and writers are legitimate users. If a reader successfully impersonates a writer, then
he can modify the corresponding data on the cloud server which includes: encrypted data,
secure indexes, and access policies. Here, this property is extended defined as no readers can
impersonate writers to illegally update any data on the cloud server.
 Inaccessible Information Invisibility. Our work first defines this security property for the
encrypted keyword search scheme. It requires no user is allowed to access the data which is
not decryptable for him according to his access privilege. In our scheme, it requires a user
cannot get information (such as Search(w) ?= ϕ: whether the search result for keyword w is
null) from search results over his undecryptable files.
 Query Privacy. Query privacy is a common security requirement for all encrypted keyword
search schemes. This security notion mainly considers the amount of information leakage
(i.e. information that directly relates to plaintext of data and keywords, corresponding secret
keys) to the cloud server regarding user queries. In other words, apart from the information
that can be acquired via observation and the information derived from it, this notion requires
no other information should be exposed. Let fQ1, Q2, ..., Qtg be a sequence of t queries, and
Wt = fw1, w2, ..., wtg be the corresponding queried keywords. Let At = fa1, a2, ..., atg be
the corresponding replies, where t ∈ N is polynomially bounded. We define the view Vt of
an adversary over the t queries as the transcript of the interactions between the server and the
involved query issuers. Vt contains the ciphertext data CT and the secure indexes I , queries
Qt and the replies At. Let Tt be the information that we allow the adversary to obtain, which
includes the results At of t queries, the identifying information (such as its hard disk position
or its memory location) of each data referred in At and the issuer of Qt. Finally, a simulation
based definition of query privacy is formally presented as follows:
Definition 5.1 Query Privacy. An encrypted keyword search protocol achieves query privacy
if for all data D, t ∈ N, and all PPT algorithms A, there exists a PPT algorithm (simulator)
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A∗, such that for all Vt and Tt, for any function f :
| Pr[A(Vt) = f(D, Wt)] - Pr[A∗(Tt) = f(D, Wt)] | < ν(k)
NOTE: k is the security parameter. A real-valued function ν(k) is negligible if for any poly-
nomial p > 0 there exists a kp > 0 such that ν(k) < 1/p(k) for all k > kp.
 Query Unforgeability. This property is only applicable to the multiple users setting: it
requires a dishonest user cannot generate a legitimate query on behalf of another (valid) user.
For a user u from the valid user set U (u ∈ U ) and a keyword w, we define u’s legitimate
query set as Qˆu= fQu(w), Sig(Qu)g. Sig(Qu) is the signature on Qu(w) if Qu(w) is indeed
generated by u’s secret key Ku, and Sig(Qu) is generated by u’s signing key SKS . Query
unforgeability is defined based on a game between an adversary and a challenger. Let uˆ be
the target user of the adversary A. In A’s game, the challenger simulates the protocol which
allows A to obtain queries on keywords of her choices with respect to user uˆ. Specifically,
A first picks her target user uˆ and is given keys of the remaining users, say, u ∈ U\uˆ. Then
A queries the oracle Φ which returns a set {Q, Sig(Q)} at her will with the restriction that
the number of queries is polynomial-bounded. Let Q′uˆ = {Q′uˆ, Sig(Q′uˆ)} denote the set of
uˆ’s queries and signatures obtained by A. A wins the game if and only if the generated
(Q, Sig(Q)) ∈ Quˆ\Q′uˆ. The advantage of A against query unforgeability is defined as the
probability of her winning the game.
Definition 5.2 Query Unforgeability. An encrypted keyword search protocol achieves query
unforgeability if for any uˆ ∈ U , and for all PPT algorithms A:
Pr[(Q, Sig(Q)) ∈ Quˆ\Q′uˆ: Q ← AΦ (fKu | u ∈ U\uˆg)
∧
Sig(Q) ← AΦ (fSKu | u ∈
U\uˆg)] < ν(κ)
 Revocability. Revocation is an indispensable property for all multi-user schemes. TA is
responsible for managing users’ identities in our scheme. If a user is no longer allowed
to access files on the cloud, one of the most important tasks of TA is revoking his search
capability. Since the incapability of searching the indexes is implied by the incapability of
distinguishing them, we define revocability based on the index indistinguishability.
An adversary’s advantage in attacking revocability is defined as her winning probability in
the following game. The adversary A runs in following two stages:
– A1. In the first stage, A1 acts as an authorized user and is allowed to access the oracle Φ
as described in Definition 5.2. At the end of this stage, A1 chooses two new keywords
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w0 and w1 which have never been queried thus far. Let state represent the knowledge
A1 gains during the first stage.
– A2. In the second stage,A2 is revoked and given the index ofwb where a coin b ∈ {0, 1}
is tossed. Finally, A2 outputs a bit b′ (as its guess for b).
A wins the game if and only if b′ = b.
Definition 5.3 Revocability. An encrypted keyword search protocol achieves revocability if
for all PPT algorithms A = (A1,A2):
| Pr[b′ = b: (state, w0, w1) ←AΦ1 ;
Revoke(A);
b ∈ f0, 1g, I(wb)← BuildIndex(wb, CKUid);
b′ ←A2(state, I(wb), w0, w1);
] - 1/2 | < ν(κ)
Remark. This definition of revocability based on the index indistinguishability addresses the
revocation of the keyword search capability. The purpose of our definition is different from the
attribute revocation (e.g. [36]) which aims to deprive users’ read access privilege corresponding
to those revoked attributes. If attribute revocation happens in our system, it requires the update of
ciphertext and its signature, and (possibly) users’ secret keys. All these should be executed together
with TA, the cloud server, and data owners, etc. The discussion of attribute revocation is out of the
scope of this section. However, we argue that both (i) keyword search capability and (ii) data access
privilege will be heavily influenced by the attribute revocation in our system, and this problem is
considered as one of our future research.
5.3.2 Assumption
We assume that the user-server collusion is not included in our adversarial model. Although this
assumption is quite strong, it is a practically reasonable assumption which is also utilized in [2, 55].
In our scheme, secret keys and the plaintext of a trapdoor are still kept secure even if such an active
attack (user-server collusion) is launched. However, from a technical perspective, the attack is
able to comprise most search schemes in another form: the server can always compare the access
patterns between a target user and the colluding user. Furthermore, illegal file-updates (coming from
the malicious users) will be permitted. All communication between any two parties is also assumed
secure under TLS/SSL in the network/transport layer.
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5.4 Concrete construction
We introduce concrete construction of the proposed scheme in this section. We consider such a
scene: after the data owner creates encrypted files on the cloud, other users (readers/writers) can
securely read/write, and retrieve interested data using the keyword search scheme which is executed
by the cloud server while considering their access right. Note that a novel and important character-
istic of our scheme is that both encrypted file body and their encrypted keyword indexes support the
many-write-many-read, which is a key contribution compared to other existing schemes.
5.4.1 Design concept
5.4.1.1 Fine-grained access control with OI-MWMR
One of the most important access control characteristics in the multi-user cryptographic cloud stor-
age model is the ability of separating readers and writers of a file. We first propose an access struc-
ture based reader/writer differentiation mechanism which achieves the OI-MWMR. The file owner
first decides two access structures Tdecrypt (used in CP-ABE) and Tupdate−sign (used in ABS), see
Figure 5.1. Then he sets (uploads) the Tupdate−sign with its encrypted file to the cloud server. For
other users (writers) who want to update the file on the cloud server at a later time, they must possess
attribute sets described in Tupdate−sign. Note that we do not need to differentiate writers and readers
at the individual-user level but at an attribute level. The latter is much better optimized than the for-
mer whose management complexities may increase linearly upon the number of users, but the latter
will not. As an example in Figure 5.1, a patient with heart disease creates his EMR access policy
for sharing with others: users who satisfy attributes tree “cardiologist”∨“nurse”∨“insurance staff”
are allowed to read (decrypt) his EMR; users who satisfy attributes structure “nurse”∧“insurance
staff”∨“cardiologist” are not only allowed to read but are also allowed to update.
Note that our scheme is different from another ABE based solution, signcryption [49, 57], which
integrates ABE and ABS together (it only requires one single access structure). Since the decryp-
tion and verification must be executed simultaneously, it thwarts their scheme from differentiating
readers and writers.
5.4.1.2 Fine-grained data access control aware keyword search
Access control needs to be enforced before the cloud server searches a keyword, and, a user is not
allowed to search through data which is not decryptable for him. We construct our proposal based
on the cloud infrastructure as described in Section 5.4.1.1 and a query protocol of Bao et al. [2, 55].
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Figure 5.1 Access Structure I. (Access Tree)
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We stress that it is not sufficient to use these schemes as-is to achieve functionality goals defined
in Section 5.2 because it is difficult for the cloud server to distinguish the relationship between a
user and numerous encrypted files only through an encrypted keyword (or called a trapdoor) he/she
generated. Our approach, access structure computation (Definition 5.4), successfully solved this
challenge issue and achieved the functionality goal.
To realize our idea, we take advantage of the access structures of CP-ABE and ABS to (i) allow
the cloud server to focus on the user’s decryptable file group; (ii) make a user prove to the cloud
server that he really holds those attributes for decryption before his query is executed. More specif-
ically, (i) is achieved by comparing the Tdecrypt of CP-ABE with the Tself−sign of ABS which is
generated by the user. (ii) is achieved by generating an ABS using the AND of all his attributes:
Tself−sign = {Uid ∧ Att1 ∧ Att2 ∧ Att3...} (Note, Uid is the user’s ID and it is considered as a
special attribute). The result of signature verification shows whether the user holds those attributes
as he claims. An example is given in Figure 5.2: a doctor can prove the possession of his attributes
“cardiologist” ∧ “heart disease dept.” ∧ “Uid” by generating an ABS with the Tself−sign . If the ver-
ification succeeds, the cloud storage server clarifies whether the user can decrypt a file by checking:
Tself−sign |= Tdecrypt = 1 or 0, “|=” is formally defined:
Definition 5.4 Let T1 (e.g. Tself−sign) and T2 (e.g. Tdecrypt) be two access trees (also called
access structure) in attribute-based cryptosystems. T1 |= T2 is an access structure computation
that outputs 1 or 0, where 1 means that at least one attribute (e.g. “cardiologist”) described in T1
meets the requirement of T2. 0 means no such attributes exist in T1 which can satisfy T21.
The proposed revocation mechanism enables the system administrator to dynamically and ef-
ficiently revoke the future’s search capability of a malicious user. We consider that such a coun-
termeasure (revoking the search capability) as a reasonable and cost-effective method against ma-
licious users in our system. First, a revoked user, who holds decryption access privilege of some
files, cannot get useful data through a wiretapping because all the communication is protected under
TLS/SSL in the network/transport layer. Second, a revoked user may indeed decrypt some files with
his old keys if he successfully intrudes into the cloud server. Sahai et al. [44] proposed a solution
of attribute revocation which enables the “ciphertext delegation” instead of a simple “decrypt then
re-encrypt” to prevent such a threat. Such protocols would solve this threat where revoked users
still can access previously decryptable ciphertexts with their old keys. This issue is out of the scope
of this section and could be considered in our future work.
1In Section 5.6.2.2, we also propose a binary tree based file management approach which can greatly reduce the
server’s computation overhead in the access structure computation.
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Figure 5.2 Access Structure II. (Access Tree)
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5.4.2 Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme consists of a tuple of algorithms fSetup(), Create(), Write(), Query(), Search(),
Read(), Update(), Revocation()g. Next, we give a detailed description.
1. Setup(): The initialization algorithm Setup() is run by TA to set the key materials for process-
ing both the file and its query related data.
(a) TA outputs cryptographic keys, (PKE , SKE , PKS , SKS), for appropriate users ac-
cording to their attributes. (PKE , SKE) are public/private keys for CP-ABE based file
encryption. (PKS , SKS) are public/private keys for ABS based file signature genera-
tion. Note: users who possess different attributes set will hold different keys, please
refer Section 4.3 for the detail of key generation.
(b) TA outputs keys to users for their encrypted keyword search. TA takes as input the
security parameter 1k and outputs its unique master secret key Kmsk ∈ Zp and the
key pair {KUid ∈ Zp, CKUid} for each user whose user ID is Uid, where CKUid =
gKmsk/KUid is a complementary key for a user. KUid is only distributed to the user as
his secret key. {Uid, CKUid} are only sent to the cloud server.
2. Create(): This algorithm includes two steps: CreateFile() creates an encrypted file with sig-
nature; and BuildIndex() builds its indexes of selected keywords.
(a) CreateFile(): The data owner first encrypts a file for sharing with other users. The
encryption is based on CP-ABE. The decryption policy in the CT is described by the
access structure Tdecrypt. The ciphertext CT of a file M is generated as:
CT = Enc(PKE ,M, Tdecrypt)
The owner then generates the signature of CT . He hashes the CT and then signs it
by the ABS. To prevent the replay attack, we insert a version number tag n to the ABS.
The server later only accepts valid updates if the new version number tag n′ satisfies
n′ = n + 1 . Later, the user will confirm the latest n of the CT from the cloud server
before she generates the signature SG.
SG = Sign(PKS ,SKS , h(CT )∥n,Tupdate−sign)
(b) BuildIndex(): The algorithm is run by the owner and the cloud server interactively.
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This algorithm outputs a secure index I(wi) for a keyword wi from {w1, w2, ...}. The
data owner first uploads the {Uid, h(wi)r} to the cloud server. h(): {0, 1}∗ → G0 is
a collision resistant hash function and r ∈ Zp is a random number. After receiving the
request, the cloud server calculates the Capw for each wi and then sends it back to the
data owner.
Capw = e(h(wi)r ,CKUid )
The data owner can build the index for each wi as I(wi). k is the key for HMAC and R
∈ Zp is a random number.
I (wi) = [R,HMACk(R)], k = h(Cap
KUid /rw )
3. Write(): The owner writes (or uploads) both the encrypted file (with signature) and its secure
indexes to the cloud server. Note the access structure of ABS, Tupdate−sign (which is trans-
mitted separately with the SG), allows the cloud server to differentiate readers and writers at
a later time. Finally, {CT, SG, n, I(wi), Tupdate−sign} are written to the cloud server.
4. Query(): For a specific keyword wi, the user first generates a trapdoor Q(wi), then he gener-
ates an ABS, Sig(Q(wi)).
Q(wi) = h(wi)KUid ,
Sig(Q(wi)) = Sign(PKS , SKS , h(Q(wi)), Tself−sign)
Note that the Tself−sign is made by all of the user’s attributes including the user’s ID: Tself−sign =
{Uid ∧ Att1 ∧ Att2 ∧ Att3...}. The signature ABS shows that the user certainly possesses
a set of attributes from the authority as he/she declared in the access tree Tself−sign. The
cloud server verifies the user’s attributes by public keys from TA. In this step, the user sends
{Uid, Q(wi), Sig(Q(wi))} to the cloud server.
5. Search(): After receiving the query, the server first checks the complementary key CKUid by
the user ID, Uid. If the Uid is valid, the server confirms the user’s decryptable file group by:
(i) Verify attribute set of the user as described in Tself−sign by the ABS-verification,
V erify(PKS , h(Q(wi)), Tself−sign, Sig(Q(wi))) ?= true
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The verification key PKS is published by TA. If the ABS verification result is true, the user’s
attributes as he/she declared in the Tself−sign are confirmed. (ii) Using Tdecrypt from CT ,
the cloud server can confirm the search scope S as the following procedure:
S = Null;
for(i = 0; i < n; i++){
//i: index number; n: total number of files.
if((Tself−sign |= Tdecrypt[i])! = 0)
S = S ∪ i; }
return S;
Then the cloud server performs the keyword search only over the scope S. It first com-
putes k′ = e(Q(wi), CKUid), and then checks each index of the data CT in the scope S as:
HMACk(R)
?= HMACk′(R). Finally, the server sends the search result to the user.
6. Read(): Using the result of the Search() step, a valid user can get the target files and read.
The Read() algorithm first verifies the SG with Tupdate−sign and corresponding public keys
PKS from TA.
V erify(PKS , h(CT )∥n, Tupdate−sign, SG) ?= true
If the verification is successful and the user’s attributes U satisfies Tdecrypt(U) = 1, then he
can decrypt CT and gets the plaintext of M .
M = Decrypt(CT ,SKE)
7. Update(): If a user holds writer’s access right (attributes), then he can update a file.
(a) Encrypt M1 to CT1.
CT1 = Enc(PKE ,M1, Tdecrypt1)
(b) Make a new SG1 with a new version number n′ = n + 1 .
SG1 = Sign(PKS ,SKS , h(CT1 )∥n′,Tupdate−sign)
(c) Upload fCT1, SG1, n′, Tupdate−signg to the cloud server as the Write() phase. Cloud
storage server will first check the version number tag n′, then verify the SG1 as depicted
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in the Write(). Finally, the cloud server accepts or rejects the update request according
to the ABS verification result.
Remark. The differences between Update() and Create() can be clarified as: (i) In each
Update(), the cloud server needs to check the ABS (e.g. SG1) using the Tupdate−sign, where
such a process is not required in Create(). (ii) In Update(), the writer can update the Tdecrypt
(e.g. change the attribute set which is initialized in Create()) to revoke/grant any attribute(s) at
the specific file-level. (iii) In Update(), the writer is able to update the secure indexes which
are initialized in Create().
8. Revocation(): This algorithm remove a user’s search ability. TA and the cloud server manage
all users’ pair {Uid, CKUid}. To revoke someone, TA just instructs the cloud server to delete
the entry from the user list L: L = L\{Uid, CKUid}, then that user is no longer able to search
the cloud storage.
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5.5 Security analysis
We analyze the security of our proposed scheme, and in particular we show that the proposed scheme
satisfies general security requirements described in Section 5.3.
Impersonation Resistance. Readers and writers have different privileges. If a reader success-
fully impersonates a writer, then he can illegally modify the corresponding data on the cloud server
which includes: encrypted data, secure indexes, and access structures. The policy to differentiate
writer with readers is defined as Tupdate−sign. Cloud server clarifies writers and readers based on the
result of ABS verification. Both readers and other unauthorized users cannot impersonate writers’
privileges because they cannot forge the ABS of writers. Consequently, the unforgeability of ABS
ensures the impersonation resistance of our scheme.
Inaccessible Information Invisibility. Information leakage from search results needs to be
considered when designing protocols for multi-user cryptographic cloud storage. In our scheme, by
implementing and exploiting access structure from attribute-based cryptosystems, the cloud server
only performs the keyword search on the user’s accessible file subset. The result of Tself−sign |=
Tdecrypt shows the cloud server whether a file is decryptable to the user without exchanging any
secret key beforehand. As a result, the output of Search() will not involve redundant information
(e.g. Whether the cloud holds any files that contains the same keyword). Our scheme achieves the
property of inaccessible information invisibility.
Query Privacy. Our protocol achieves Definition 5.1 in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 The proposed encrypted keyword search scheme achieves query privacy in Definition
5.1 if HMAC is an unforgeable MAC, h() is a pseudorandom function, and CP-ABE is secure.
Proof. It suffices for us to construct a PPT simulator A∗ such that for all t ∈ N, for all PPT
adversaries A, all functions f , given the Tt, A∗ can simulate A(Vt) with non-negligible probability.
More specifically, we show that A∗ with Tt can generate a view V ∗t which is computationally
indistinguishable from Vt, the actual view of A. Next we discuss both t = 0 and t > 0.
If t = 0, then Qt = ∅, At = ∅, Sig(Qt) = ∅. A∗ builds V ∗t = {CT ∗, I(w)∗} from random
elements. It is easy to check that V ∗t and Vt are computationally indistinguishable if HMAC is
unforgeable (for generating I(w) in the Capw) and the CT based on the CP-ABE [5] is secure.
Recall that the generation of I(w) contains a random number generation and a HMAC computation
on that random number each time, so all I(w) generated from the same keyword are different from
each other and the HMAC is also infeasible to be forged.
If t > 0, A∗ builds V ∗t = {CT ∗, I(w)∗, Q∗t , Sig(Qt)∗, A∗t }. To be general, we suppose that
all queries q in Qt are from distinct users, but some of them may query the same keywords. (i)
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Discussion of CT ∗ and I(w)∗ are almost the same as the case of t = 0. (ii) For Q∗t and Qt, recall
that the generation of Qt is decided by both h(w) and KUid : Q(w) = h(w)KUid . A∗ first generates a
simulated complementary key set {x∗1, ..., x∗u} for all entries which x∗u ∈ Z∗p. A∗ selects a simulated
complementary key element from the set {x∗1, ..., x∗u}, say x∗i for u∗i . Then, A∗ selects a random
element element rg ∈ G0, and it can generate a simulated Q∗i = rx
∗
i
g . We can see an actual query
Q(w) = h(w)KUid and a simulated query Q∗u = r
x∗u
g are computationally indistinguishable if h() is a
pseudorandom function. (iii) For Sig(Qt)∗ and Sig(Qt), recall that Sig(Qt) is generated from the
Qt as Sig(Qt) = Sign{PKS , SKS , h(Qt), Tself−sign}. A∗ selects a simulated SK∗ ∈G, together
with the simulated Q∗ = rx∗g as we described in (ii), and he generates h(Q∗) and Sig(Qt)∗. It is
easy to see an an actual Sig(Qt) and a simulated Sig(Qt)∗ are computationally indistinguishable
if h() is a pseudorandom function. (iv) Finally, for A∗t and At, given the above indistinguishability
results, the indistinguishability between A∗t and At is straightforward. 
Query Unforgeability. Our protocol achieves Definition 5.2 in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 The proposed encrypted keyword search scheme achieves query unforgeability in
Definition 5.2 if ABS is an unforgeable signature scheme.
Proof. To prove this theorem, it suffices for us to state that if there exists a PPT adversary A
that breaks the query unforgeability of our protocol defined in Definition 5.2 with an advantage ϵ,
then there exists a PPT adversary B that can first forge a query Q(w) for a target keyword w, and
moreover, B can succeed in forging the digital signature, ABS, for the forged Q(w) with the same
amount of advantage. We briefly provide the proof of this theorem which is based on the security
proof of ABS’s unforgeability in Maji et al. [38] (Detailed proof is omitted here).
The detailed proof contains two parts: (i) The first part is straightforward: A valid query is gen-
erated as Q(w) = h(w)KUid . An adversary is infeasible to retrieve KUid without Kmsk according
to CKUid = gKmsk/KUid , because the master secret key Kmsk is assumed to be securely managed
by TA. (ii)Based on the result of ABS’s unforgeability of Maji et al. [38], an adversary B, without
accessing the secret signing key of the target user, B’s probability of successfully generating Sig(Q)
from Q, which satisfies Verify(PKS , Q, Tself−sign, Sig(Q)) = True, is negligible. Concluding both
parts, B’s total advantage for generating the legitimate query set {Q,Sig(Q)} must be negligible.
This proves the theorem. 
Revocability. Our protocol achieves Definition 5.3 in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 Our protocol achieves revocability in Definition 5.3 if HMAC is a preimage resistant
MAC scheme.
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward, and we only state the intuition behind the proof. The in-
dexes of the two keywordsw1 andw2 are I(w1) = [R1,HMACkw1 (R1)], and I(w2) = [R2,HMACkw2 (R2)],
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where R1 and R2 are random, kw1 and kw2 denote the secret keys generated from w1 and w2, re-
spectively. Since the complementary key CKUid of a revoked user is deleted from the user list
L, the revoked user can never get kw1 and kw2 from the keywords and the query key KUid it has.
Finally, the only way that the revoked user can guess the correct bit of b is trying to reverse the
HMACkw1 (R1) or HMACkw2 (R2) to get information about w1 and w2. Based on the preimage
resistance security property of HMAC [18], we can conclude that I(w1) and I(w2) are independent of
w1 and w2, respectively, from the perspective of the revoked user. So the advantage of the adversary
guessing the correct bit cannot be significantly different from 1/2.
5.6 Discussion and Performance Analysis
We first give a discussion of our schemes by comparing with several latest existing works. Then, we
analyze the performance of our scheme in terms of the computation overhead and search efficiency.
5.6.1 Discussion
Several existing works close to ours have been proposed recently. Works of [28, 36, 53] are related
to the access control of cryptographic cloud storage, and [2, 8, 17, 35, 51, 52, 55] are related to the
multi-user encrypted keyword search schemes.
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In Wang et al. [53], an owner’s data is encrypted block-by-block using the symmetric key cryp-
tography. A binary-key tree is constructed over the block keys to reduce the number of keys given
to each user, and all binary-key trees for all files must be managed by files’ owners. If owners want
to share their file with other users, they must distribute the binary-key tree to all users individually.
Users’ read and write rights are not separable: valid users can only read (or called decrypt) files
but cannot update the original files. Ion et al. [28] and Li et al. [36] adopted the ABE (CP-ABE
or KP-ABE) for data encryption to achieve the fine-grained access control. Since their works and
our work all try to realize fine-grained cryptographic cloud storage by the help of attribute based
cryptosystems, we compare the computation complexity of these three works, and the results are
summarized in Table 4.1. Ion et al. [28] describes a secure publish/subscribe framework in which
publishers (owners) can share encrypted information with subscribers (readers) with the help of
untrusted brokers (storage servers), a 1-write-many-read scheme. The work of Li et al. [36] also
describes a fine-grained data access control protocol for sharing personal health records in the cloud
storage. Multi-authority KP-ABE of Chase et al. [16] is used for providing data confidentiality and
fine-grained data access control. Compared with our scheme, Li et al. [36] considered a different
set of requirements of the write accesses to the cloud: a time-limited write permission. To update
a file, the user must first contact the owner (who must be online to reply) for a one-time individual
authorization. The owner generates a signature with a specific valid period, and then encrypts the
time-limited signature and the time information by a public-key encryption algorithm (Details of
signature and public-key encryption algorithms are not specified, and we use Csign and Cenc to de-
note their computation cost for a comparison in Table 4.1). Their update access control frequently
requires the owner’s help. Moreover, different from our scheme, [36] discussed a different revoca-
tion, attribute revocation, which revokes the read access privilege. Consequently, neither of these
schemes achieves the OI-MWMR for multi-user cryptographic cloud storage.
Works of [2, 8, 17, 35, 51, 52, 55] considered the multi-user encrypted keyword search scenario.
Bao et al. [2, 55] is one of the design bases of our scheme. Their scheme allows each user to possess
a distinct secret key for generating the trapdoor respectively. The key advancement of our scheme
over theirs is that our scheme realize the fine-grained access control aware search approach and the
multi-user updatable secure index. Boneh et al. [8] presented a scheme for searching on encrypted
data using a public key system that allows mail gateways to handle email based on whether certain
keywords exist in the encrypted message. In their work, asymmetric keys allow multiple users to
encrypt data using the public key, but only the user who has the private key can search and decrypt
the data. Sharing the unique private key with multi-users is one solution, however, in this case, the
user revocation becomes prohibitively expensive because all queries are generated from the same
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key, and to revoke the key means not only to re-generate all the indexes but also to re-distribute a
new key to all non-revoked users. Tomida et al. [51] proposed a searchable encryption scheme based
on the identity based encryption. This scheme requires the owner generates a number of indexes for
each search respectively, and each index is only restricted to a specific user’s ID. In other words,
before searching a keyword, a searcher needs to request the data owner to generate an individual
index set on the cloud for his personal use only. Obviously, the management cost of personal indexes
increase linearly with the number of searchers. Because their scheme searches a trapdoor through a
predetermined index set which is manually assigned by the owner but not automatically determined
by the searcher’s read access right, it does not satisfy the requirement of access right aware search.
Also, revocation is not considered in their scheme. Finally, [8, 51] are highly dependent on the
existence of data owner, and users cannot execute the keyword search without the help of the owner
(e.g. when he is off-line).
Curtmola et al. [17] partly solved the multi-user problem using broadcast encryption. The set of
authorized users share a secret key r (which is used in conjunction with a trapdoor function). Only
people who know r will be able to access/query the data. A user can be revoked by changing r,
and using broadcast encryption [41, 40] to send the new key r′ to the set of authorized users. The
revoked users do not know r′, and hence cannot search. Li et al. [35] proposed authorized private
keyword search (APKS) over encrypted data for multi-user cloud storage using the Hierarchical
Predicate Encryption (HPE). In their construction of privacy aware search, capabilities (trapdoors)
were distributed by a Trusted Authority (TA) or a Local TA (LTA). So, the trapdoor distribution
is obviously a cumbersome task. C. Wang et al. [52] gave a keyword search encryption and some
properties of their scheme appear similar to ours. They integrate the symmetric key predicate en-
cryption into KP-ABE, which provides the keyword search with the property of fine-grained access
control. Their scheme allows an owner to share his data with authorized readers, and these readers
are also allowed to search the cloud according to their access right. The shared data (including its
indexes) is not allowed to be updated by other users, and revocation is not supported. Since indexes
are integrated into the ciphertext data, it is difficult to update the data or indexes separately. If
the owner wants to add/remove an index, the only way is to reconstruct the whole ciphertext data.
Consequently, works of keyword search schemes [8, 17, 35, 51, 52] do not support the (multi-user)
update of indexes.
Table 5.1 gives a comparison between these existing schemes and our scheme. The comparison
is functionality-classified in two folds: access control and encrypted keyword search. Access control
includes three security characteristics, Fine-grained, Many-Write-Many-Read, Owner-independent
file update. Encrypted keyword search includes TA/Owner independent trapdoor generation, Access
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right aware search, Revocability without re-encryption and re-index, Multi-user updatable secure
index.
5.6.2 Performance Analysis
We first analyze the computational cost of the file body processing on the client side in section
5.6.2.1. Then, we give a contrastive performance simulation to show the effectiveness and efficiency
of our fine-grained access control aware approach in section 5.6.2.2.
5.6.2.1 Performance analysis of access control mechanism
As described in our proposal, the following steps, which process the body of a file for access control,
are fully processed on the user’s client side: (i) CreateFile(), (ii) Read(), (iii) Update(). Section 4.5
summarized the result of computation complexities of each process.
We make performance estimations for each process step: CreateFile(), Read(), Update() to show
the feasibility of the proposed access control scheme. Basically, processing time of CP-ABE and
ABS is dependent on the computations of paring and exponentiation, so we make the estimations
based on the processing time of paring and exponentiation. The criterion of our estimation is based
on the result of Guillevic [27], which implements the pairing over a prime-order elliptic curves on
a computer with 2.6 GHz Celeron 64 bits CPU, 1 GB RAM and Ubuntu 10.04.4 LTS OS. On their
implementation, one pairing takes 5.05ms, and one exponentiation takes 5.16ms. Assume N is the
number of attributes in the access structure. From details of cryptographic operations described in
Section 4.3, the CP-ABE Encryption is mainly composed of (2N+2) exponentiations; the CP-ABE
Decryption is composed of (2N+1) parings and N exponentiations. In the other side, the processing
of ABS is a little complicated than the CP-ABE. The ABS-Sign is composed of (5N+3) exponentia-
tions; the ABS-Verification process, in the maximum case, is composed of (N+2) parings and (2N+1)
exponentiations. As an example of N = 10, let tcreate, tread and tupdate denote the processing time
of CreateFile(), Read(), Update(). According to the criterion from [27], the processing time will
approximately be: tcreate = 387ms, tread = 327ms, tupdate = 387ms. Compared with files download
and upload time, we think the performance of the proposed scheme is reasonable for cryptographic
cloud storage.
5.6.2.2 Performance analysis of access control aware keyword search scheme
We first give a binary tree based file management approach for the proposed access structure com-
putation which greatly reduces the cloud server’s computation overhead. Then, we give a theoretical
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simulation to show the effectiveness and efficiency of our scheme.
The result of the access structure computation Tself−sign |= Tdecrypt shows whether the en-
crypted file with an access structure Tdecrypt can be decrypted by a user with attributes described
in her Tself−sign. Assume the number of encrypted files on the cloud server is n, then in a naive
implementation, the cloud server must execute Tself−sign |= Tdecrypt n times for each query. We
can see such a naive method takes too much computation overhead for the cloud server. Here, we
propose a binary tree based file management method for the access structure computation which
greatly reduces the server’s computation overhead. As a toy example shown in Figure 5.3, let fA,
B, C, Dg be an entire attributes set, then the pointer to a file with Tdecrypt = {(A ∧B) ∨ (C ∧D)}
can be located under the leaf nodes of f1100g and f0011g of the binary tree. We assume such a file
locating process is done by the server when each encrypted file is uploaded to the cloud. Then, if a
query constructed by a user with Tself−sign = {(A∧B)} (which is expressed as f1100g) is sent to
the server, with the binary tree based method (Figure 5.3), the cloud server can easily identify the
corresponding pointers to all decryptabled files (or says, identify the search cope) under the nodes
of f0000g, f0100g, f1000g, f1100g. Under such a binary tree based file management, for a user
whose number of attributes is k, the cloud server can identify his decryptabled files by collecting file
pointers under 2k leaf nodes. We say the computation overhead of such execution is much smaller
compared with a naive method.
Next, we theoretically simulated the performance of the proposed scheme. To show the key
feature of our scheme, we adopt a contrastive simulation between an existing multi-user search
scheme and ours:
(i) An existing search protocol proposed by Bao et al. [2, 55], which is an encrypted keyword
search scheme without considering access right.
(ii) Our scheme. Cloud server performs the keyword search while being aware of the user’s access
right.
Our theoretical performance simulation is based on the following settings. The number of en-
crypted files on the cloud server: Nfile = 500 (Figure 5.4) andNfile = 1000 (Figure 5.5), the average
number of keywords for each encrypted file: Nkeyword = 10, the number of attributes in the access
structure Tself−sign for generating the ABS: Nattribute = 10, let Ndecrypt be the decryptable files
number of the user who generates the query. Recalling the Search() phase in Section 5.4.2, we note
that to execute the Search() without considering the ABS based scope narrowing, the cloud server
computes one paring and one HMAC for each index attached to the encrypted file. We measured
the time of HMAC using the OpenSSL toolkit 1.0.1 under a VMware environment with the similar
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Figure 5.3 Binary tree based file management of attribute set
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benchmark setting of Section 5.6.2.1, and it costs thmac = 0.0037ms 2. Then, we implemented the
access structure computation, Tself−sign |= Tdecrypt, using C language. The maximum attribute
number of an access structure is set as Nattribute = 10. To obtain the average computation time
tbinary, we measured the time of Tself−sign |= Tdecrypt within the range 1 ≤ n ≤ Nattribute3,
the result is tbinary = 0.00027ms. Following the criterion of Section 5.6.2.1, an ABS-Verification
approximately costs tverify−abs = 169ms.
Finally, we conclude the time for both cases (i) and (ii) as we described above.
(i) Tsearch−all = Nfile ×Nkeyword × (tparing + thmac)
(ii) Tsearch−partial = tverify−abs +Nfile × tbinary+
Ndecrypt ×Nkeyword × (tparing + thmac)
2HMAC algorithm takes a 16[bytes] random number as its input, and we choose a secret key of 256[bits].
3Each attribute in the access structure is 32[bytes] in our implementation.
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Figure 5.4 Simulation of runtime comparison for Search() of cases (i) and (ii) based on the param-
eter setting: Nfile = 500.
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Figure 5.5 Simulation of runtime comparison for Search() of cases (i) and (ii) based on the param-
eter setting: Nfile = 1000.
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We simulate both cases by taking a sample of Ndecrypt from the following two sets: f25, 50, 75,
150, 250g and f50, 100, 150, 300, 500g. It means that the number of decryptable files is assumed
to vary separately from 25 to 250 for Nfile = 500, and from 50 to 500 for Nfile = 1000. Figures
5.4, 5.5 contrastively show the simulation results for both cases: the execution time Tsearch−partial
of case (ii) for searching a keyword through the user’s decryptable file group is obviously improved
than the execution time Tsearch−all of case (i) for searching through all files on the cloud server.
In Figure 5.6, we also show the performance trend of much more variation of files number, where
the Nfile = 100, 300, 500, 1000, 2000. Our scheme is shown quite efficient because it narrows the
search scope and minimize those extra computation (e.g. paring and HMAC in the Search() phase)
from unreadable files.
Remark. From the simulation results we can see that the performance of the Search() execution
is roughly proportional to the performance of the paring computation. For cloud servers equipped
with high-performance CPUs and the parallel processing architecture, the runtime for paring com-
putations can be improved, and moreover, multiple paring computations can be parallelly-processed
in less time.
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5.7 Conclusion of this work
In this section, we interdependently harmonized the access control approach to the encrypted key-
word search, and proposed the fine-grained access control aware keyword search. The security of
the proposed scheme is proved based on several newly extended or defined security requirements.
Contributions of our work is clearly shown by a comparison study with several latest existing works.
Finally, an efficient implementation method of the proposed scheme is given for reducing compu-
tation overhead. As the contrastive performance simulation results, owing to narrowing the server’s
search scope to the user’s decryptable subset, our scheme decreases information leakage from the
keyword search progress, and is shown to be efficient.
Among the discussion of Section 5.4.1.2 and Section 5.3 (Definition 5.3), we argued that the
following problem, where a revoked user can still read (decrypt) his previously decryptable cipher-
texts with old keys because his attributes are not revoked, is one of our next research directions.
We would like to discuss the solution and try to give an extended scheme that protects the proposed
cloud system from such a scenario. Exploiting the attribute-based encryption of Sahai et al. [44]
(which provides attribute revocation) together with our scheme would be the most promising and
could be considered in future work.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Future work
In this dissertation, we study three special techniques: (i) encrypted keyword search in single-user
cryptographic cloud storage, (ii) fine-grained and flexible cryptographic access control in multi-user
cryptographic cloud storage, (iii) access control aware encrypted keyword search in multi-user cryp-
tographic cloud storage. Although these techniques are being or expected to be widely discussed for
the cloud computing research, they are not well studied when considering the security/efficiency/-
functionality, three-fold trade-off model in the modern cloud environment which contains various
resource-constraint client-devices and powerful cloud server. In particular, our research provides
contributions as follows.
We first present bloom filter based encrypted keyword search schemes which support wildcard/-
fuzzy searches in the single-user cryptographic cloud storage. We observe that in an actual en-
crypted keyword search application, because it’s very difficult for a user to remember each keyword
precisely and it will be very convenient if the cloud service can support various typical searching
behaviors and typing habits, e.g. fuzzy search. The proposed schemes utilize a space-efficient prob-
abilistic data structure, Bloom filter, and two kind of wildcards to support a more flexible, expressive
query. Several related works have been proposed in recent years. Compared with existing works,
our schemes which consider most efficiency/security/functional requirements of such a single-user
cloud service, (1) are much more cost-effective in terms of network traffic, computation and storage
cost of the user client by which lots of computation/storage are transfered to the powerful cloud
server’s side; (2) are analyzed under a strong, widely accepted security model for the searchable
encryption, called adaptive IND-CKA2. The analysis proves the proposed search scheme leaks no
more privacy information to the cloud server than what is allowed by the security definition for
semantic security. (3) are constructed on a hash-based bloom filter. This provides simpler imple-
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mentation than most existing works with lots of complicated cryptographic computation.
Next, to realize many-write-many-read-many-search in a multi-user cryptographic cloud storage
which provides much more advanced functionalities than a single-user cloud service, we studied
this motivating problem and propose schemes in a two-step approach. At first, we combine and
exploit the cryptographic access control techniques from two functional encryption techniques, the
attribute-based encryption (ABE) and the attribute-based signature (ABS), to realize an owner-
independent many-write-many-read scheme for the multi-user environment. The proposed access
structure computation provides an flexible, fine-grained access control for the cryptographic cloud
storage which may holds numerous users and files. Then, we proposed the fine-grained access
control aware encrypted keyword search to realize the many-search. This is a novel search concept
in the literature where the cloud server is only allowed to search an encrypted keyword over the
searcher’s decryptable data subset by combining the proposed cryptographic access control scheme,
access structure computation, to the encrypted keyword search scheme. Two advantages of our
approach over most existing works are shown by our security analysis and performance simulation.
(i) Decreasing the information leakage from the keyword search process which is executed between
users and the cloud server. (ii) Being more efficient than existing works since the proposed method
does not need to examine those unreadable files. Moreover, the proposed many-write-many-read-
many-search approach allows the secure update of both the encrypted data and their indexes from
trusted, authorized users. The search scheme is also analyzed with a variant of the stronger model,
adaptive IND-CKA2.
In the future, we will continuously discuss following related topics, (1) improve the search
efficiency with multi-party computation techniques, (2) improve the security model of encrypted
keyword scheme to allow the automatic verification of security properties, e.g., automatically verify
privacy property (information leakage) of the search scheme using some automatic cryptographic
protocol verifier.
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